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Statement of Facts #12 of 12 from:

Reversing_Landmark_Abomination_Cases

Saving Babies from judges & voters
Saving Souls from ‘Scrupulous Neutrality’ about Religion

by proving in courts of law and in the Court of Public Opinion that:

 The right to live of a baby and of a judge are equal
 The Bible & reality-challenged religions are NOT equal

A strategy of Life that relies on the Author of Life
for pro-life, pro-Bible Lawmakers, Leaders, Lawyers, and Laymen

by Dave Leach R-IA Bible Lover-musician-grandpa (talk) 18:11, 15 October 2023 (UTC)

Try to imagine how a judge, reviewing a prolife law with these Findings of Facts, would be able to dodge this evidence - in fact, see if you can find ANYONE who can refute these facts - as opposed to not caring about facts - that is, not caring about reality:

Statement of Fact #12 of 12:

Judicial Interference with Constitutional Obligations is Impeachable.

Any state judge interfering with this state’s compliance with the 14th Amendment and its ancient authority to protect its people ^[1] – the central reason governments exist, is an accessory to genocide according to the uncontradicted consensus of court-recognized fact finders, and is guilty of exercising the legislative function, in order to perpetuate genocide through an unconstitutional ruling, which exceeds the judicial powers given by the state Constitution, which is Malfeasance in Office, a ground of impeachment. ^[2]

Should any federal judge so interfere, this state appeals to its congressional delegation to examine similar grounds for disciplinary action, along with exercising its Article III, Section 2, paragraph 2 authority to make “exceptions” and “regulations” designed to end SCOTUS’ long line of landmark abomination cases. ^[3]

This state also appeals to its congressional delegation to exercise its life-saving and rights-protecting authority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment whose plain words give Congress, not courts, the authority to correct state violations of Rights,4 which subsumes the authority to define their scope and balance competing interests, while the “privileges and immunities” clause identifies as protectable rights those listed in the Constitution. ^[4] Official world-wide definitions of “crimes against humanity” apply “to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.” ^[5] Any court review of this law must be expedited, because lives are lost with each day that courts delay.

The following footnotes are enriched by selections from the following amicus briefs filed in Dobbs v. Jackson: 396 State Legislators from 41 States <> Melinda Thybault/Moral Outcry

INDEX to all 12 Statements of Facts
Statement_1_+_Footnotes Courtrecognized, court-tested Finders of Facts unanimously establish that unborn babies are fully human
Statement_2_+_Footnotes Courts Accept the Fact-Finding Authority of Legislatures, Juries, Experts for the same good reasons their findings persuade the public.
Statement_3_+_Footnotes The FACT that Babies are Fully Human was never denied or ruled irrelevant by SCOTUS.
Statement_4_+_Footnotes Heartbeats & Brain Waves are Legally Recognized Evidence of Life.
Statement_5_+_Footnotes Legislatures should regulate abortion, as Dobbs held, just as legislatures regulate the prosecution of all other murders.
Statement_6_+_Footnotes The full humanity of a tiny physical body is hard for many to grasp. But what distinguishes us from animals isn’t physical, and has no known pre-conscious stage.
Statement_7_+_Footnotes Congress has Already Enacted a Personhood Law as Strong as a “Life Amendment”. The 14th Amendment already authorizes Congress to require all states to outlaw abortion.
Statement_8_+_Footnotes Roe, Dobbs, and the 14th Amendment agree: All Humans are “Persons”.
Statement_9_+_Footnotes When pregnancies develop into medical emergencies requiring separation of mother and child to save the mother, the child has an equal fundamental right to life and medical care.
Statement_10_+_Footnotes Tyranny over any class of humans by any other is prohibited by the Constitution, by the Declaration which gives the purpose of the Constitution, and which rests its own authority on the revelation of God in the Bible.
Statement_11_+_Footnotes The 14th Amendment gives courts no authority to invent rights not specified in the Constitution, like the right to murder, and gives legislatures no authority to legalize violations of Constitutional Rights.
Statement_12_+_Footnotes Judicial Interference with Constitutional Obligations is Impeachable.

==

FOOTNOTES

↑ More about “the ancient authority of state legislatures...to protect the lives of all its people – an authority which no court can legitimately remove.”
     Courts that overturn the prolife laws of “red states” interfere with the ancient duty and power of every government, in every generation, to protect life, points out the amicus brief filed in Dobbs v. Jackson by 396 State Legislators from 41 States.(www.supremecourt.gov/Docket PDF/19/19-1392/185121/ 20210728125120809_Dobbs%20Amici%20brief_State%20Legislators_07272021.pdf)

     State legislators have the constitutional duty, and therefore the power, to protect the fundamental, civil rights of persons. The fundamental law in which those fundamental rights are found is the common law, which consists of both natural duties and those ancient, customary rights and immunities that are foundational to ordered liberty. Thus, a state legislature must declare and secure to all persons within the protection of its laws the rights that those persons have by natural and customary law. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1997) (upholding state legislation that prohibited assisted suicide and reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’.” (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977)).

     William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765): “Hence,” he said, “it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.” Id. Blackstone taught that the legislative power is to declare existing common-law rights and duties and to remedy any defects in the legal security for those rights. Id. at *42-43, 52-58, 86-87
     The Founders echoed this view in the Declaration of Independence, declaring that governments are instituted among men in order to secure the inalienable rights with which human beings are endowed by nature and nature’s God. They also accused the crown and Parliament of infringing the rights of “our constitution,” which in 1776 could only have been a reference to the common-law constitution of British North America. This view predicated the Constitution of the United States, which expressly secures natural rights, such as life and religious liberty, and common-law rights, such as jury trials and freedom from the quartering of soldiers in one’s home, and expressly disclaims any intent to disparage the other rights of the fundamental law.
     Indeed, the point of having legislatures, executives, and courts is to secure the rights that Americans already have. Neither state legislatures nor the Constitution of the United States create those rights. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (stating that “it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a preexisting right,” that it “is not a right granted by the Constitution,” and is not “in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”).
     Some, but not all, of the rights of natural persons are enumerated [listed] in the Constitution of the United States and its amendments. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; art. IV, §2; amends. I-VIII. Others are enumerated in state constitutions. See e.g., Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 766 (No. 13,156) (C.C.D.N.H. 1814). Still others are declared in American constitutions but not enumerated. U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration of certain rights herein shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people.”) (emphasis added). State legislatures have a duty to declare and secure all fundamental rights, both enumerated and unenumerated.
     Fundamental rights are those that persons enjoy by fundamental law—natural law and common law— with or without any written constitution. Because the common law includes natural rights, to understand the fundamental rights declared and secured by the Constitution, it is sufficient to look to the common law, especially as explained by William Blackstone. Established common-law doctrines constitute the best evidence of the existence and meaning of both enumerated and unenumerated, fundamental rights.
     The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.” Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888). The terms and concepts of the common law provided the “the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar.” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162, 167 (1875). Accord James R. Stoner, Jr., Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking American Constitutionalism 9-29 (2003).
     American constitutional rights are not philosophical abstractions. They are described in detail in common law treatises, such as those by Coke and Hale, and especially Blackstone’s Commentaries. The framers crafted American constitutions—state and federal—in common law terms. And Blackstone was their teacher and lexicographer....
     As this Court has rightly acknowledged, Blackstone’s “works constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999). Blackstone retained his influence through the adoption of the Civil War Amendments. James M. Ogden, Lincoln’s Early Impressions of the Law in Indiana, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 325, 328 (1932). And this Court continues to turn to Blackstone today.
     [2 A few examples from recent years include Gamble v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (the Court’s opinion, the concurrence, and one dissent citing Blackstone multiple times to determine the meaning of the phrase “the same offense” in the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause); Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969 (2020) (calling Blackstone’s Commentaries a “satisfactory exposition of the common law of England”); Ramos v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) (citing Blackstone in explanation of the holding that the requirement of juror unanimity is “a vital right protected by the common law” and therefore the Constitution’s jury trial guarantee); Torres v. Madrid, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 989, 996, 997, 998, 1000 (2021) (citing Blackstone multiple times to determine meaning of Fourth Amendment “seizure”). ]...
     But as the Ninth Amendment makes clear, the enumeration of certain common-law rights does not deny or disparage all the other rights that the American people enjoy by virtue of natural law and their ancient customs. The Ninth Amendment expressly reserves to the people those civil and fundamental rights that they enjoyed prior to ratification, which are their natural rights, other common-law rights and liberties, and some privileges enumerated in state constitutions.

     Because many states refused to remedy infringements of fundamental rights [for blacks] prior to the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to ensure to all persons due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, and to empower Congress to remedy infringements of those rights. It bears emphasis that the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to recall state legislatures to their original task. Far from repealing the people’s retention of fundamental rights declared by the Ninth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment strengthened it. And far from abrogating the duty of state legislatures to declare and secure unenumerated rights, the Fourteenth Amendment reinforced that duty.

     That is, the rights retained by the people but not protected by their state, such as the right of Blacks to liberty, was strengthened – at the expense of the freedom of the legislature to torpedo those rights.
     And as Statement #11 and its footnotes explain, the 14th Amendment did not supplant the duty of legislatures to protect rights with that duty in courts. The only authority over state violations of rights given courts by the 14th was to enforce federal laws enacted by Congress. The authority of courts we see today, to make up “rights” not found in the Constitution and impose them on states without waiting for Congress to pass a law, was not given by the 14th, but was seized by courts in violation of the Constitution.
↑ More about “exercising the legislative function, in order to perpetuate genocide...exceeds the judicial powers given by the state Constitution, which is Malfeasance in Office, a ground of impeachment”
     Legislatures have considerable untapped potential for restraining their activist courts when they become confused about which branch of government they are.
     Perhaps the major reason few people even think about solutions is fear of any change to the balance of powers between the legislature and the courts. “Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.” We don’t want to just switch tyrants. A change to a real solution requires wisdom, which requires study, and who wants to study? Another obstacle to restraining courts to their constitutional function is that most people, even Christians, limit their goals to what they consider “realistic”, and especially “politically realistic”, which usually means what people think they can do without God. Trust that what Jesus promised about “impossible” goals is truly “realistic”, enables us to think about not just what would be a little bit better, but about what would be perfect. and then to think about doing whatever we can think of to move in that direction, fully aware how feeble our own steps are, trusting God to open up new opportunities, in His time, as we walk with Him.

     My own feeble steps were drafted into a bill in Iowa in 2020. The bill is posted at http://savetheworld.saltshaker.us/wiki/
     Judicial_Accountability_Act:_How_Legislatures_can_stop_judges_from_legislating
     Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Brad Zaun liked the idea and got it numbered and introduced, but it came to him too late that year to get it through the “funnel”, and he was disappointed that there was no organized group helping make other lawmakers aware of it.
Judicial Accountability Act: How Legislatures can stop judges from legislating

     Summary: what the bill accomplishes
     1. No district court injunctions. A single district judge can't overturn a law. Any legislature is well within its constitutional authority to prohibit any district court (lower court) from invalidating a law – only the Supreme Court should be allowed to do it, and only within 90 days. Letting a single lower court judge overturn the work of 150 lawmakers which include several attorneys and constitutional scholars is insane. Any challenge to a law should go directly to the most experienced judges in the state.
     2. Supermajority required. It takes 5 of the 7 justices of the Supreme Court to overturn a law. A simple majority of justices overturning by one vote a law produced by tens of thousands of people over several years is a scandal. It has nothing to do with wisdom, law, or the Constitution. When judges can’t even agree with each other, unanimously, whether to destroy the work of the majority of voters and their representatives, they prove they are not so much wiser than everybody else in their state to be trusted with such unbridled power. At the very least any injunction should have their unanimous support before they should have any power to shut down the will of their whole state. A supermajority that is short of unanimous may be OK if it is not the final word but is followed by further opportunities for the legislature to restore their law.
     3. Expedited. The Court has to rule in 3 months if the court blocks a new law from taking effect with a Temporary Restraining Order. If the court invalidates an existing law, the invalidation doesn't take effect for one year. Courts bottling up laws with injunctions for years while they make up their minds should make them ashamed. They don’t need years. No controversial law is passed without months if not years of scrutiny by attorneys for and against. Their briefs are already ready. They already know what the other side will say. They don’t need years to think of what to say or how to respond. Maybe a day. Maybe two.
     Nor do judges need months to read the briefs for several weeks to bring themselves up to speed on the issue. The law has been in the news for years. There is no honor in willful ignorance of the issues until the first brief is filed.
     Laws are passed to correct serious wrongs. Years of work costing millions of dollars goes into fixing problems. There is no good reason to delay justice for the citizens of a state for years to wait while judges try to agree among themselves whether to allow justice as understood by the majority of voters and lawmakers.
     4. Discussion. The legislature may compel designated justices to attend a public hearing to debate the constitutionality of the law within one year of such a ruling, by passing a resolution. Provided a supermajority of the Supreme Court has agreed on an injunction in less than a month, the legislature should then be able, within the next year, to compel the attendance of judges under their jurisdiction to discuss and debate, with specified legislators in a public hearing, the constitutional justification for [or necessity of] that judicial exercise of the legislative function.
     5. The legislature may overturn the invalidation by a 60% vote, by a resolution, leaving the last word, the final verdict, with incredibly well informed voters (through ordinary elections of lawmakers and retention of justices). The resolution overturning the invalidation would give reasons responsive to the reasoning of the judicial ruling.

     The Bill: Iowa SSB3181 2020 AD'
     A BILL FOR
     1 An Act regarding legislative oversight of supreme court
     2 decisions, and including applicability provisions.
     3 BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF IOWA:
     Introduction/Legislative Findings
     1 Section 1. NEW SECTION. 602.1615 Legislative findings ——
     2 challenges to the validity of a statute —— exclusive jurisdiction
     3 —— public hearings —— legislative oversight.
     4 1. The general assembly finds and declares all of the
     5 following:
If the legislature can even impeach,
it can at least ask questions

     6 a. The power to impeach subsumes reasonable less severe
     7 remedies.
     Lawmakers take an oath
     to uphold the Constitution too
     Their responsibility to uphold the Constitution
     requires action against courts
     that interfere with their responsibility
     8 b. The intent of this section is to provide for a mechanism
     9 in which to resolve disputes regarding the constitutionality of
     10 laws between the courts and the legislature, both of which are
     11 composed of constitutional scholars.
     Jurisdiction of courts is
     restricted by the legislature
     12 c. Article 5, section 4 of the Constitution of the State
     13 of Iowa states that the supreme court is “a court for the
     14 correction of errors at law, under such restriction as the
     15 general assembly may, by law, prescribe . . .”.
Judicial power to invalidate laws
is not given by the Iowa Constitution

     16 d. Article 3, section 20 of the Constitution of the State
     17 of Iowa gives the legislature the power to impeach judges for
     18 “malfeasance in office”, which is generally defined to include
     19 acting without authority and abusing power. The power to
     20 impeach subsumes all lesser remedies.
     21 e. The Constitution of the State of Iowa does not give the
     22 courts of this state the power to invalidate laws enacted by
     23 the legislature, to require the legislature to enact different
     24 laws, or to publish rulings that have the same effect as new
     25 legislation. Article 3, section 1 of the Constitution of
     26 the State of Iowa states: “The powers of the government of
     27 Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments —— the
     28 legislative, the executive, and the judicial: and no person
     29 charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
     30 of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining
     31 to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly
     32 directed or permitted”.
The Legislature must get involved
when courts legislate unconstitutionally

     33 f. Although the courts of Iowa have usurped those powers
     34 without constitutional authority, it has been done for reasons
     35 which the general assembly respects. The general assembly

     1 welcomes the expertise and guidance of the courts in evaluating
     2 the constitutionality of its laws. But when the reasoning of
     3 rulings which function as legislation appears to be not only
     4 unsound, but unconstitutional, the general assembly has the
     5 constitutional duty and authority to determine that judges and
     6 justices have abused their power and exceeded their authority,
     7 which are grounds for impeachment under the malfeasance in
     8 office clause.
     9 g. A remedy short of impeachment should advance wisdom,
     10 build consensus, and educate voters so that informed voters
     11 may hold both judges and legislators accountable. Article 1,
     12 section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Iowa states:
     13 “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
     14 instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the
     15 people, and they have the right, at all times, to alter or
     16 reform the same, whenever the public good may require it”.
The Meat of the Bill:

the Enforcement Section

Lower courts can't invalidate laws

     17 2. The supreme court shall have discretionary and exclusive
     18 original jurisdiction over any challenge to any law. A
     19 district court or the court of appeals shall not invalidate a
     20 law on any grounds.
Supreme Court must rule

within 3 months, by supermajority,
when the Court blocks a new law.
When the Court blocks an existing law

the block will not take effect for one year.

     21 3. A decision of the supreme court that invalidates
     22 existing law or has the effect of creating new law shall not
     23 have any effect unless agreed to by five or more of the seven
     24 justices, and otherwise shall not have any effect for one
     25 year. The supreme court shall also have the power to suspend
     26 implementation of a new law provided the supreme court produces
     27 an expedited ruling within three months of the law’s enactment.
Public Hearing

     28 4. a. Within one year of the date a supreme court decision
     29 is published that invalidates existing law or has the effect
     30 of creating new law, the general assembly may, by resolution,
     31 compel the attendance of specified justices to a public hearing
     32 to discuss and debate the justification for the decision with
     33 members of the general assembly. A public record of the
     34 hearing shall be made.
Impeachment grounds inquiry

     35 b. During or after the hearing, the general assembly shall

     1 determine if grounds to begin impeachment exist as to any
     2 of the justices present at the hearing for acting without
     3 authority or malfeasance in office.
Judges may improve their ruling
with respect to the status of the challenged law

     4 c. Based on the results of a hearing commenced pursuant to
     5 this subsection, a justice whose presence was required at the
     6 hearing may change the justice’s vote or alter the justice’s
     7 individual contribution to the decision.
Legislature may overturn court invalidation

     8 5. A supreme court decision invalidating existing law or
     9 having the effect of creating new law will not take effect if
     10 two-thirds of both the senate and the house of representatives
     11 approve a resolution to overturn the decision within one year
     12 of the date the decision was published. The resolution must
     13 specify the basis for overturning the decision, including
     14 its reasoning, not to be limited by court precedent that is
     15 responsive to the supreme court’s initial published decision,
     16 and must be documented by expert testimony and constitutional
     17 authority.
Legislature may add statement to the ruling

     18 6. The general assembly may issue its own statement to a
     19 published supreme court decision that invalidates existing law
     20 or has the effect of creating new law if done within one year of
     21 the date the decision was published. The statement must regard
     22 the constitutionality of the invalidated existing law or the
     23 newly created law.
     24 Sec. 2. APPLICABILITY. This Act applies to decisions
     25 published by the supreme court on or after the effective date
     26 of this act.

     FAQ's
     Questions and Answers
     Why are existing laws treated differently than new laws?
     The difference is for the benefit of the public, so the laws governing them do not flip back and forth from being in effect. A new law – for example, the Heartbeat law – could be suspended by courts only until the suspension is overturned by the legislature. An existing law – for example our former marriage laws requiring spouses to be of the opposite sex – could not be suspended for one year, to give the legislature time to respond. No chaotic back and forth.

     Could courts suspend a new law between its effective date and the court ruling?
     The legal action a court takes to invalidate a law is an Injunction. The process here doesn’t specify it, but would allow the normal process of allowing the courts to immediately suspend a new law with a TRO, Temporary Restraining Order, until their hearing, at which the temporary order could become permanent. In the case of an existing law, by contrast, allowing the court to immediately suspend the law, with the possibility of it going back into effect after the legislature acts, would subject the public to a law which is in effect, then suspended, then back into effect.
     If this law removed the court’s power to put a TRO on a new law, the law would take effect until the ruling, then it would be suspended, but then the legislature might give it effect again.
     What will be the effect of a 4-3 ruling that a law is unconstitutional?
     (Summary: no legal effect, but much political pressure) Although a 4-3 ruling would no longer have legal force, it would still have powerful political force. A ruling that a law is unconstitutional would be a public relations challenge for the legislature. The legislature would face pressure to refute the judges' claims point by point, or adjust the law voluntarily. A 4-3 ruling would not be powerless; and of course it would still be binding on the parties to the case. But an argument in defense of the legislature ignoring the challenge would be that after all, the justices themselves barely agree the law is unconstitutional.
     Would a ruling always trigger a public hearing? That decision is made independently of a decision to vote to override the court. “Within one year, the legislature MAY, by a resolution, compel the attendance of specified Iowa judges ....”

     Is one year for the legislature to act too long? Too short?
     One year from the court’s ruling is needed to process the ruling’s reasoning, to hold hearings which would require passage of a resolution by both chambers, and then to schedule a vote, which could be while the legislature is not in session. A year is needed.
     On the other hand, requiring courts to act in 3 months is reasonable, considering this is not a brand new question before them that they have never heard of before. They have had all the years of public debate on the issue to think about the issue. Plus, courts are accustomed to ruling quickly when cases are required to be “expedited”.
     Would prolife laws do any better under this system?
     Yes, along with all other laws relating to immorality, which are targeted by the Landmark Abomination Cases of the U.S. Supreme Court. Iowa courts think themselves bound by SCOTUS precedent, but the Iowa legislature is not and should not be.
     The 14th Amendment makes state legislatures subject to federal laws which protect the rights of state citizens that are listed in the Constitution, which is the meaning of the “privileges and immunities” clause of the 14th. But the 14th gives SCOTUS no authority to make up “rights” hostile to enumerated rights, much less to enforce “rights” without waiting for federal law to lay out the manner and scope of protection.
     Neither federal courts nor Congress have any authority through the 14th or through anything else to block states from protecting constitutional rights.
     The Act laid out here will only get state courts out of the legislature’s way of protecting the rights of state citizens. When federal courts jump in the way, they can be shoved aside with the legal arguments of Clarence Thomas and others that are summarized in Statement #11 of this book.

     Is a 2/3 majority requirement necessary? Shouldn't a simple majority of the legislature be enough to override courts?
     (Summary: practically & legally, certainly; politically, complicated) This may be the hardest detail to muster a quick opinion. There are strong arguments for either choice; perhaps there is even a third option: a 60% vote. As this bill proceeds, perhaps it should be expected that a consensus will form later requiring amendment of this detail. The current draft requires a 2/3 majority.
     The Practical Argument: Currently, courts get away with a simple majority requirement (4-3) which faces zero accountability from anybody. This draft requires a 5-2 vote; another option is 6-1. Should the legislature face a similar hurdle? Several lawmakers believe a 2/3 requirement removes any practical hope of ever overturning a judicial invalidation of a law, because the Iowa legislature is incapable of agreeing by 2/3 that the sun is up. A 2/3 requirement would make restraint of lawmaking judges actually harder than passing a constitutional amendment!
     In Congress, our U.S. Constitution says a 2/3 majority is enough to send an amendment to the Constitution before the states for their ratification.
     But if we let the legislature overturn the court’s invalidation with a second simple majority, it could be objected that would be almost ridiculously easy for the legislature to gather together the same “yea” votes a second time (if an election doesn’t intervene). A 60% requirement could answer that concern.
     However, that objection could also be met by pointing out that the ruling of the courts would give typically 60 pages of reasons the law should be overturned, which would put a lot of pressure on those “yea” votes to either eloquently and exhaustively justify their votes or vote “nay”. It would not be easy to secure a majority a second time under that pressure.
     The public hearing option would put that 60 page ruling on a level playing field with reasoning from lawmakers. It would make both legislatures and courts accountable not only to each other, but to reason. It might even make lawmakers upset enough to reach a 2/3 agreement.
     Voters, informed as has never before been possible about judges on the ballot, or about the legal skills of lawmakers, would have the last word.
     The Political Argument: The public is not used to legislatures having ANY power to correct unconstitutional rulings. A 2/3 requirement would be less of a shock to tradition. Were this bill to pass into law with a 2/3 requirement, and lawmakers saw how unnecessary it was, lawmakers could ease the requirement in the future - since this does not require amending the constitution, which already grants more than this power, but requires only a law.
     Amendment. Should it be decided that a simple majority of the legislature to overturn a court’s invalidation is sufficient, here is the simple change that could do it - simply strike out “two-thirds of” (or replace it with “six tenths of”):
     8 A supreme court decision invalidating existing law or
     9 having the effect of creating new law will not take effect if
     10 <strikethrough>two-thirds of</strikethrough> both the senate and the house of representatives
     11 approve a resolution to overturn the decision within one year
     12 of the date the decision was published.
     Is it practically possible to require courts to add a statement from the legislature up to a year after its ruling?
     When the Supreme Court first publishes its ruling, that is not the final version that will be later given an official permanent citation in the Northwest Reporter series. (Their contact information) Unpredictable delays are caused by litigants asking for rehearings, and courts taking time to respond. Even after that option is exhausted, court staff continue proofing their decisions, a process that can take months. [Iowa Supreme Court Clerk phone number: 515-348-4700] Northwest Reporter doesn’t officially publish a case, and give it a permanent citation, until a state supreme court notifies them that it is ready. That is why a new case has only an Iowa citation that does not list a page number or volume number, and doesn’t get a fancy N.W.2d permanent citation until much later.
     Requiring the Court to leave the publication open for a year in case the legislature chooses to submit a statement would affect only the time the Court notifies Northwest Reporter, and it may not even affect that time at all.
     The farther this bill gets, the more discussions there will be about it with the Iowa Bar Association and the Court itself. If delaying final publication that long is deemed unreasonable, an amendment could easily give the legislature an earlier deadline. It might also require the legislature to notify the court of an intent to exercise that option.
     Of course, this entire final sentence of this bill is not critical to legislative correction of judicial overreach. It could be conceded if necessary to save the rest of the bill. But it is an appropriate correction of the current system.

     Will an expedited hearing that begins in the Supreme Court diminish the time needed by the litigants to fully present their claims?
     (Summary: anyone ready to block a law from taking effect is ready for court) A challenge to a new law means (and perhaps this bill could so specify, although I think it is already clearly implied) a challenge to a law that has not yet gone into effect, to keep it from going into effect (beginning with a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) the day it would go into effect).
     In such a case the state itself will normally be the defendant, and the petitioner will be a well funded group that tried to kill the law in the legislature but failed. In that situation the petitioner will already be prepared legally, their arguments well honed through interaction with lawmakers. It is hard to imagine that any less prepared petitioner would be ready with a TRO to stop a law before it goes into effect.
     Iowa court rules already require appellants to outline their issues in their initial notice of appeal, which is more pressure on individual defendants to prepare that far ahead, in proportion to their means, than challengers to a new law will face, who will be fully primed for a court battle before the law passes the first chamber.
    &nbspCourt rules already require that any issue argued in the Supreme Court must have first been raised in the district court, so any responsible lawyer in district court will already be prepared for the Supreme Court.
    &nbspDistrict courts are needed to develop facts through witnesses in front of juries, depositions, and cross examination of expert witnesses. Supreme courts don’t do any of that. Expert witnesses can submit Amicus Briefs but the other side can’t cross examine them. Although judges can cross examine the lawyers for both parties in oral arguments, which district judges don’t do.
    &nbspThus district courts are essential in criminal trials where the guilt of the defendant needs to be proved to juries, and in civil trials between two parties. But their value in a challenge to a law is less clear. A legislature’s “findings of facts” are given deference except in the case of a “fundamental right”, under current practice, but the court practice of overturning laws that violate made-up “fundamental rights” has zero authority under the U.S. Constitution, and nothing prevents state legislatures from copying into state law the provision of the U.S. Constitution in Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 2, that court jurisdiction is subject to such “exceptions” and “regulations” as the legislature enacts.
    &nbspWere the petitioner an individual seeking relief only for himself and not for anyone else affected by the law, courts have many tools for giving relief to individuals short of invalidating whole laws. For example, extenuating circumstances, interaction with other laws affecting the individual, or necessity in order to avoid serious injury (Iowa 704). The applicability of laws to individuals is the jurisdiction of the judicial branch, with which the legislative branch has no intent to interfere, any more than the judicial branch should interfere with the jurisdiction of the legislative branch to establish laws of general application.
    &nbspAfter a law has already gone into effect, then there is no requirement to expedite. In fact, the decision to challenge a law could be made by the parties to the case, or by a judge, at any point during a years-long case: in pre-trial briefs, a district judge’s ruling, or during the appeal before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. With this bill the applicability of the law to the individual defendant could still be suspended, but the law itself, as applied to everyone else, would not be suspended until after the Supreme Court so rules and then only if the legislature does not block the suspension. The legislature’s year to respond would not begin with any ruling made before the Supreme Court’s supermajority ruling.

     Are there any U.S. Supreme Court precedents relevant to these half dozen powers?
     (Summary: making judges answer lawmakers' questions is a staple of confirmation hearings) These proposed powers are all completely unprecedented in law, although some of them have been discussed. Probably the one never before discussed is the idea of a public hearing.
    &nbspSurely the prohibition of a district judge overturning a law, limiting that power to the state Supreme Court, and requiring a supermajority of the court to overturn, is well within the power given the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of courts.
    &nbspPublic Hearings
     How about public hearings? Is there any legal or constitutional principle that shields judges from having to explain their rulings any better than they do in their written opinions? Is there something nefarious about requiring judges to answer questions? Federal judges answer questions about their past rulings in confirmation hearings for appointments to higher courts. If U.S. Senators can require them to answer questions about their rulings years later, why can’t state legislatures require their state judges to answer questions at the time? Judges justify not answering questions about future potential cases, that they may remain free to rule in view of facts and arguments they might not see until then, but there is no reason to shield judges from explaining their past cases.
     Especially since the Public Hearings envisioned in this bill are not only to clarify whether a law ruled unconstitutional actually is unconstitutional. The second purpose of these Public Hearings is to investigate whether there are grounds for impeachment. Because if the legislature determines that the court’s ruling of the law’s unconstitutionality is utterly lacking in merit, then judges who so ruled were legislating; they were acting without authority, exercising a power of a different branch of government than their own, which is malfeasance of office, an impeachable offense.
     Obviously, in any impeachment trial, the judges would be required to answer questions. These public hearings are a power subsumed under the power of impeachment; they are a reasonable, less severe remedy.
     Certainly the very idea of communication between lawmakers and judges on a “level playing field” is unheard of. Unprecedented. (Outside confirmation hearings.) Current communication, which tradition will be slow to reconsider, is somewhat like a parent trying to reason with a child who is as inarticulate as he is stubborn.
     It is a special challenge for a lawyer representing the legislature to reason with a judge who gives only the scantest clues to what is on his mind before he rules, after which it is too late to respond to his errors. Does any Constitutional or legal principle require such a breakdown of communication? Does this ritual serve any good purpose?
     Once President Washington asked SCOTUS for its advisory interpretation of a treaty. The justices declined, saying “The lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of government – their being in certain respects checks upon each other – and our being judges in a court of last resort – are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra judicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to executive departments.” https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/george-washington-and-the-supreme-court/
     https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Thomas%20Recipient%3A%22Washington%2C%20George%22%20Author%3A%22Supreme%20Court%20Justices%22&s=1111311111&sa=supre&r=3&sr=
     That answer is not a precedent for keeping courts from communicatint with legislatures for two reasons: (1) it was not a sensible answer then. The Constitution puts no limit on who the President can consult for advice, while Proverbs 15:22 says “in a multitude of counsellors, purposes are established”. I can’t imagine where SCOTUS came up with the idea that the President was limited to asking his department heads. Washington asked for advice, not a binding ruling. That’s what “extrajudicial” means. (2) SCOTUS then declined to get involved in an issue which it otherwise would never face. This is different than asking a Court to make up its mind earlier than later.
     It is not wrong to ask judges to give advisory opinions to lawmakers so lawmakers don’t have to spend years crafting laws which judges at the last minute decide to overturn. The August 8, 1793 answer was before Americans had to worry about activist judges who leave the future of legislation, and indeed the very future of human rights, very much in doubt. However, asking judges to give an advisory opinion about a law before it is passed is probably impractical, since judges are used to taking longer to study an issue than a legislature is in session, and also since even after giving an early opinion, new evidence or argument might come later which would flip the Court’s ruling.
     An expedited three month deadline is probably the closest we can come to a timely response from courts. Certainly legal wrangling that dribbles on for years exhausts the patience of rational minds.
     The subject of the public hearing is whether the law really was unconstitutional. Because if it wasn't, then the judges plainly acted outside their authority, which is grounds for impeachment. But beyond being grounds for impeachment, an order given that is beyond one's authority to give is legally invalid. So surely the legislature has the authority to investigate whether an order was invalid, and upon establishing that it is, to reverse its effects.
     Sheltering judges from interaction doesn’t make them free of bias. In every other human interaction, accountability is the best way to cleanse a hard heart of bias.
    &nbspThe Two-Thirds Majority
     The only thing remotely relevant to this 2/3 vs. simple majority requirement in American constitutional law that I can think of is that to ratify a constitutional amendment, Congress has to pass it by 2/3 before states pass it by 3/4. But the solution here doesn’t change the constitution; it only defines how the legislature is choosing to exercise authority already given by the Iowa Constitution.
     If anything, there is a constitutional principle favoring the power of legislatures over courts, with respect to Fundamental Rights. The 14th Amendment is the part of the Constitution which courts have taken to give them jurisdiction over states who trample fundamental rights. But who did the 14th Amendment authorize to enforce its provisions? Not courts! Rather, Congress, according to Section 5 of the Amendment.
     Yet here are examples of not just state laws, but even state constitutional amendments, which were overturned by courts for violating the “equal protection” clause of the 14th Amendment:
     Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) a Missouri oath to hold office designed to keep out former confederate soldiers was ruled an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) a California same sex marriage ban. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) a Colorado gay rights ban.
     Awad v. Ziriax, 10th Circuit, January 10, 2012 an Oklahoma ban of the use of Sharia Law in court.
     Giles v. Harris, 1903, and Giles v. Teasley, 1904, courts winked at disenfranchising Blacks, but explicitly accepted jurisdiction over state constitutions violating the 14th and 15th Amendments.
     The authority to enforce the requirements of the 14th Amendment, given to Congress and not courts, gives Congress also the authority to define and apply fundamental rights, and for anyone seriously in doubt, to clarify who is a human being and therefore deserves to have his fundamental rights protected.
     These are philosophical as well as legal questions which merit national discussion, but while courts are sheltered from having to talk to anybody the conversation has been one sided. America needs to open this up into what Proverbs 15:22 calls a “multitude of counsellors”. It does not undermine respect for the judiciary to imagine judges are able to explain their reasoning.
     If Legislatures overturn court rulings, won’t they exercise the authority of the judicial branch?
     (Summary: legislative action wouldn't affect litigants; only the part of the ruling that reaches wrongfully into legislating) No. On that future day when a legislature overturns judicial rulings, the legislature’s action would not apply to the parties to the case, so the “separation of powers” aspect of the ruling is untouched.
     There are several reasons a court may exempt a litigant from the effects of a law, without invalidating the law for everyone else. The simple difference between courts and legislatures is that legislatures pass laws which apply to everybody, while courts apply those laws in specific cases, only to the parties to the case, guided by the special facts and circumstances of the case. The power given by this bill to legislatures to overturn rulings applies only to the part of the ruling where the court stepped outside its constitutional authority in order to nullify a law passed for the benefit of millions of others.
     The purpose of the public hearing is only for the legislature to investigate whether their law was constitutional after all, and if so, to take back their constitutional authority to pass laws by their subsequent vote.
     Lawmakers take oaths to defend the Constitution too. Courts cannot rob lawmakers of their power to obey the Constitution without violating the constitution themselves. Perhaps that is the key principle declared implicitly by this bill: judges aren’t the only branch of government authorized to understand and defend the Constitution. The other branches are too. That balance needs to be restored. The conversation needed needs to be among equals.

     Shouldn’t judges be immune from popular pressure? We don’t want our rights subject to a vote!
     Neither legislatures nor courts should have the last word over each other. We have seen what happens when legislatures had the last word, in the South, during the time of slavery. And we have seen what happens when courts had the last word, in 1857 and 1973; regarding slavery and abortion.
     Even the Iowa constitution gives the last word to voters. Is that dangerous? America’s Founders talked about popular whims that could remove important protections over the weekend if the public could vote on individual issues continually. They set up 6 year terms for U.S. Senators and 4 year terms for presidents explicitly to shield our Rule of Law from whims the public might hold for only a month. Nor does this process give voters direct control over the outcome of a disputed law, but only equips them to evaluate the wisdom of their elected representatives and their judges, which is the same as our current system except this leaves voters much better informed.
     The 14th Amendment expanded the power of courts to overturn laws which violate “fundamental rights”. It made slave-loving southern state legislatures accountable to courts. Unaddressed was what to do when it is courts which violate fundamental rights. This measure is an attempt to restore balance. It is interesting that the 14th Amendment actually leaves its own enforcement not to courts, but to Congress.
     The “independence of the judiciary” from popular whims is well protected by lifetime tenure. This measure does not change that. It only defines a remedy for Iowans when judges rule lawlessly and unconstitutionally.

     Didn’t Iowa decide recently not to impeach judges for their rulings? Summary: “Overreaching” can only reach so far before it turns into full fledged unconstitutional legislating.
     Removal from office, for just one harmful ruling which may be out of a long career of beneficial rulings, is pretty drastic; not to mention ineffective since it leaves the ruling in place that triggered the impeachment!
     That is why remedies short of impeachment are necessary, as well as remedies able to focus on the problem without cutting off talent which is mostly beneficial. If an assembly line produces an occasional klunker amongst its generally great output, we keep the assembly line and discard the klunker; we don't keep the klunker and blow up the assembly line!
     Iowans seriously considered impeaching judges for their rulings not so long ago. Highlights are discussed at the Brennan Center:

     A 2011 review by the National Center for State Courts’ Gavel to Gavel website also found numerous bills introduced in state legislatures that year to impeach judges and justices because of disagreement over specific rulings. Several of those introductions were part of a failed effort in Iowa to remove four Iowa Supreme Court Justices for their decision in a high-profile case about marriage rights for same-sex couples.
     The impeachment attempt garnered significant media attention, but also widespread condemnation – even from members of the sponsors’ own party. Iowa Governor-elect Terry Brandstad (R) [sic] said at the time that disagreement over a ruling did not constitute grounds for impeachment. “There’s a difference between malfeasance and over-reaching,” said Brandstad, “the Constitution says what the grounds for impeachment are. My reading is it’s not there.” Iowa House Speaker Kraig Paulsen (R), whose chamber would have voted on the impeachment, sent the resolutions to languish in an inactive committee and said, “I disagree with this remedy,…I do not expect it to be debated on the floor of the House, and if it is, I will vote no.”

     I respectfully disagree with Governor, later Ambassador Branstad. When the Iowa Supreme Court not only struck down laws limiting marriage to opposite sex couples, but specifically ordered county clerks to solemnize “marriages” between same sex couples, that reaches beyond “overreaching”. “Overreaching” implies a mild going-a-little-too-far out of one’s proper jurisdiction.
     But if the plainest example of a “person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to” the judicial branch of government exercising “any function appertaining to” the legislative branch can be dismissed as mere “overreaching”, then it is impossible for any other judicial legislating to violate the Iowa Constitution. We might as well just give judges the password to the Iowa Code database and let them write whatever laws they please. As Rep. Matt Windschitl said January 27, 2020 on the Jeff Angelo show, “Do we really want judges deciding laws? If so, why do we even have a legislature?” Article 3 Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution says “Departments of government. The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments — the legislative, the executive, and the judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others....”

     FAQ’s: Judicial Philosophy

     Isn’t it unconstitutional to impeach a judge for a ruling? Summary: It can’t be unconstitutional to correct the part of a ruling that unconstitutionally legislates. Although it has not been established definitively, whether a judge may be impeached over a ruling, most legal discussion avers that would be unethical, and there is no precedent of a successful impeachment over the content of a ruling. Most legal discussion is of the U.S. Constitution; the Iowa Constitution specifies that judges can’t legislate, which is only implied in the U.S. Constitution.
     The United States Constitution provides little guidance as to what offenses constitute grounds for the impeachment of federal judges...However, the impeachment power has historically been limited to cases of serious ethical or criminal misconduct. - Brennan Center
     It is generally supposed that legislative action to correct an unconstitutional ruling, or to discipline a judge who writes one, would be unconstitutional.
     The Constitution does not “provide for resignation or impeachment whenever a judge makes a decision with which elected officials disagree” said four judges when President Clinton and Senator Dole urged impeachment of a judge over his ruling on admissibility of evidence. “These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent judiciary and…mislead the public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy.” Brennan Center
     Let’s make a distinction glossed over by those four judges: between a ruling hated because it applies existing law and facts in a way most people think is wrong, and a ruling hated because it overturns laws by a rationale that most people think is unconstitutional. I agree with the four judges that the case was correctly kept off limits to lawmakers, but the judges generalized their criticism to the extent of dismissing concerns about truly unconstitutional rulings as being mere decisions “with which elected officials disagree”. It is that degree of generalization that is “a grave disservice” by elevating “the principle of an independent judiciary” beyond the reach of the Constitution, of common sense, and of accountability of any kind from any source.
     What I have not found in law review articles is any proposed remedy for when a ruling itself is unconstitutional. I have not found it even acknowledged that it is possible for a ruling to be unconstitutional. As if to say “how could judges rule unconstitutionally? Judges ARE the constitution.”
     But it is judges themselves, in vigorous dissents, who stir public concern about the constitutionally of certain rulings. Judges who write dissents are as qualified as those in the majority, and their reasoning is often equally persuasive. When the public has a basis this solid for concern about the constitutionality of rulings, it is surely in the public interest, and not contrary to any known legal or constitutional principle, to hold a public hearing where those concerns can be addressed and hopefully resolved, where judges, perhaps for the first time in America history, can be compelled to interact with experts other than each other.
     In fact, any time a law is overturned for being unconstitutional, but the ruling is flawed and a correct ruling would actually not find the law unconstitutional, then actually the ruling itself is unconstitutional because the ruling amounts to raw legislation. It is unconstitutional for courts to pass laws.
     Let me emphasize this point. Any ruling that overturns a law is either correct because the law is in fact unconstitutional, or is itself unconstitutional because its reasoning or factual basis is flawed. Lawmakers take oaths to defend the Constitution too, and should not be unconstitutionally deprived of the power to enforce it when they see a violation.
     If we may agree that it is at least theoretically possible for a ruling overturning a law to be unconstitutional, shall we insist the Constitution requires the legislature to honor every unconstitutional ruling?
     Suppose there were a law against painting your house red, someone was prosecuted for painting his house red, and the court refused to convict because it is surely unconstitutional to outlaw painting your house red. Even without a formal nullification of the law, the law would be defacto nullified because prosecutors would know the court won’t convict anybody for that crime. It may be reasoned that rulings overturning laws merely formalize this natural process.
     Public hearings would bring healing to our national division over issues less clear than the right to paint your house red.
     As is pointed out below, the power this bill gives the legislature to overturn a judicial validation of its laws would not usurp judicial powers. It would not affect individuals who are actual parties named in the case. It would only affect that part of the ruling which wrongfully reaches into lawmaking, changing the laws which affect millions of other people who are not named in the case.
↑ More about “similar grounds for disciplinary action”
For example, see “Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution” at www.osaka.law.miami.edu/~schnably/GringrichContractWith America.pdf (sic)
↑ More about “Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress, not courts, the authority to correct state violations of the Right to Life and of Equal Protection of the Laws”
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment so plainly gives Congress, not courts, the power to correct state violations of fundamental rights, that it is an amazing story how SCOTUS has usurped that power for itself and completely denied it to Congress, and how Congress has let them.
Largely relying on the dissents and concurrences of Justice Clarence Thomas, this story is told in Statement #11 and its footnotes. See “What Happened to Unalienable Rights, and How to Get Them Back” and “ ‘Substantive Due Process’: how SCOTUS usurped the Constitution’s Authority to Define Rights, and Congress’ Authority to Enforce Rights, into its own authority to reclassify abominations as ‘rights’ ”
↑ More about “...definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ apply ‘to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.’ ”
     “A crime against humanity occurs
     when the government withdraws legal protection
     from a class of human beings
     resulting in severe deprivation of rights,
     up to and including death.”
     - amicus in Dobbs of Melinda Thybault/Moral Outcry
     Melinda Thybault’s amicus brief was the 20th amicus docketed in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022). (www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-1392/184968/ 20210726175018044_41206%20pdf%20Parker%20III%20br.pdf)
     Her references, backing up that damning judgment:
See “Crime Against Humanity” at www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ crime_against_humanity and see U.N. Office, Genocide Prevention, Crimes Against Humanity www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml; Treaty of Rome (1957). See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War .

     Her characterization of international documents is not only fair, but it understates the culpability of elected representatives. Actual quotes from the documents lay responsibility at the feet, not just of impersonal “government”, but of government’s “representatives”.
     Notice in the following definitions that those targeted for prosecution in international human rights tribunals include elected representatives and senators who “tolerate” crimes against humanity – who don’t actively execute their authority to criminalize these assaults on the Image of God. (Genesis 1:27)
     “Genocide”, defined: “Genocide means...acts...with intent to destroy...in part, a national...group [in our case, Americans] [by] killing members of the group [in our case, babies; and by] Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group....” Here is the complete United Nations statement:

     Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

     (a) Killing members of the group;
     (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
     (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
     (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
     (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

     - Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide / Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 / Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XII / www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.pdf

     The 1948 definition above is cited in the following 1968 United Nations General Assembly resolution (which took effect two years later) which nullifies any “statute of limitations” on “crimes against humanity”:

Article I: No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of their commission:...(b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations,...the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.

     The following Article II applies the call for prosecution at any time, not limited by a Statute of Limitations, to elected representatives. The word “elected” is not there, but the context certainly includes them, especially since one cannot “represent” another, as the word is normally defined, without their voluntary authorization.
     By not limiting the definition of “representatives” to those who are elected, the definition does not exclude judges.

Article II: If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this Convention shall apply to representatives of the State authority and private individuals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly incite others to the commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission. (Article II, Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War, ADOPTED 26 November 1968 BY General Assembly resolution 2391 (XXIII))

     If [genocide] is committed,
     the provisions of this Convention shall apply
     to representatives of the State authority
     who tolerate [its] commission.

     Including judges.
     And elected representatives
      who are lax in restraining them.
Thybault writes, “...the Court has not yet fully reversed Roe, Doe, and Casey.” She submitted this observation to the Court which finally reversed all three, technically, although the slaughter continues in most states so her observation is still timely. “No American citizen should have to live under, nor as history tragically demonstrates, should they stand by silently, while their government sanctions and even promotes crimes against humanity.” Another low point in the Supreme Court’s grasp of 14th Amendment equal rights, she mentions, was Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) which, like Roe and Dred Scott, “denied legal protection to a class of human beings” and “ignored the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment”. “Plessy accepted the gloss that ‘separate but equal’ was ‘equal’.”
     She repeats, “When the government withdraws legal protection from a class of human beings, it is the classic definition of a crime against humanity.”

[1] More about “the ancient authority of state legislatures...to protect the lives of all its people – an authority which no court can legitimately remove.”
Courts that overturn the prolife laws of “red states” interfere with the ancient duty and power of every government, in every generation, to protect life, points out the amicus brief filed in Dobbs v. Jackson by 396 State Legislators from 41 States.(www.supremecourt.gov/Docket PDF/19/19-1392/185121/ 20210728125120809_Dobbs%20Amici%20brief_State%20Legislators_07272021.pdf)

State legislators have the constitutional duty, and therefore the power, to protect the fundamental, civil rights of persons. The fundamental law in which those fundamental rights are found is the common law, which consists of both natural duties and those ancient, customary rights and immunities that are foundational to ordered liberty. Thus, a state legislature must declare and secure to all persons within the protection of its laws the rights that those persons have by natural and customary law. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1997) (upholding state legislation that prohibited assisted suicide and reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’.” (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977)).

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765): “Hence,” he said, “it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.” Id. Blackstone taught that the legislative power is to declare existing common-law rights and duties and to remedy any defects in the legal security for those rights. Id. at *42-43, 52-58, 86-87
The Founders echoed this view in the Declaration of Independence, declaring that governments are instituted among men in order to secure the inalienable rights with which human beings are endowed by nature and nature’s God. They also accused the crown and Parliament of infringing the rights of “our constitution,” which in 1776 could only have been a reference to the common-law constitution of British North America. This view predicated the Constitution of the United States, which expressly secures natural rights, such as life and religious liberty, and common-law rights, such as jury trials and freedom from the quartering of soldiers in one’s home, and expressly disclaims any intent to disparage the other rights of the fundamental law.
Indeed, the point of having legislatures, executives, and courts is to secure the rights that Americans already have. Neither state legislatures nor the Constitution of the United States create those rights. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (stating that “it has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a preexisting right,” that it “is not a right granted by the Constitution,” and is not “in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”).
Some, but not all, of the rights of natural persons are enumerated [listed] in the Constitution of the United States and its amendments. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; art. IV, §2; amends. I-VIII. Others are enumerated in state constitutions. See e.g., Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 766 (No. 13,156) (C.C.D.N.H. 1814). Still others are declared in American constitutions but not enumerated. U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The enumeration of certain rights herein shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people.”) (emphasis added). State legislatures have a duty to declare and secure all fundamental rights, both enumerated and unenumerated.
Fundamental rights are those that persons enjoy by fundamental law—natural law and common law— with or without any written constitution. Because the common law includes natural rights, to understand the fundamental rights declared and secured by the Constitution, it is sufficient to look to the common law, especially as explained by William Blackstone. Established common-law doctrines constitute the best evidence of the existence and meaning of both enumerated and unenumerated, fundamental rights.
The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.” Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888). The terms and concepts of the common law provided the “the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar.” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162, 167 (1875). Accord James R. Stoner, Jr., Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking American Constitutionalism 9-29 (2003).
American constitutional rights are not philosophical abstractions. They are described in detail in common law treatises, such as those by Coke and Hale, and especially Blackstone’s Commentaries. The framers crafted American constitutions—state and federal—in common law terms. And Blackstone was their teacher and lexicographer....
As this Court has rightly acknowledged, Blackstone’s “works constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999). Blackstone retained his influence through the adoption of the Civil War Amendments. James M. Ogden, Lincoln’s Early Impressions of the Law in Indiana, 7 Notre Dame L. Rev. 325, 328 (1932). And this Court continues to turn to Blackstone today.
[2 A few examples from recent years include Gamble v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019) (the Court’s opinion, the concurrence, and one dissent citing Blackstone multiple times to determine the meaning of the phrase “the same offense” in the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause); Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969 (2020) (calling Blackstone’s Commentaries a “satisfactory exposition of the common law of England”); Ramos v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) (citing Blackstone in explanation of the holding that the requirement of juror unanimity is “a vital right protected by the common law” and therefore the Constitution’s jury trial guarantee); Torres v. Madrid, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 989, 996, 997, 998, 1000 (2021) (citing Blackstone multiple times to determine meaning of Fourth Amendment “seizure”). ]...
But as the Ninth Amendment makes clear, the enumeration of certain common-law rights does not deny or disparage all the other rights that the American people enjoy by virtue of natural law and their ancient customs. The Ninth Amendment expressly reserves to the people those civil and fundamental rights that they enjoyed prior to ratification, which are their natural rights, other common-law rights and liberties, and some privileges enumerated in state constitutions.

Because many states refused to remedy infringements of fundamental rights [for blacks] prior to the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to ensure to all persons due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, and to empower Congress to remedy infringements of those rights. It bears emphasis that the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to recall state legislatures to their original task. Far from repealing the people’s retention of fundamental rights declared by the Ninth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment strengthened it. And far from abrogating the duty of state legislatures to declare and secure unenumerated rights, the Fourteenth Amendment reinforced that duty.

That is, the rights retained by the people but not protected by their state, such as the right of Blacks to liberty, was strengthened – at the expense of the freedom of the legislature to torpedo those rights.
And as Statement #11 and its footnotes explain, the 14th Amendment did not supplant the duty of legislatures to protect rights with that duty in courts. The only authority over state violations of rights given courts by the 14th was to enforce federal laws enacted by Congress. The authority of courts we see today, to make up “rights” not found in the Constitution and impose them on states without waiting for Congress to pass a law, was not given by the 14th, but was seized by courts in violation of the Constitution.

[2] More about “exercising the legislative function, in order to perpetuate genocide...exceeds the judicial powers given by the state Constitution, which is Malfeasance in Office, a ground of impeachment”
Legislatures have considerable untapped potential for restraining their activist courts when they become confused about which branch of government they are.
Perhaps the major reason few people even think about solutions is fear of any change to the balance of powers between the legislature and the courts. “Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.” We don’t want to just switch tyrants. A change to a real solution requires wisdom, which requires study, and who wants to study? Another obstacle to restraining courts to their constitutional function is that most people, even Christians, limit their goals to what they consider “realistic”, and especially “politically realistic”, which usually means what people think they can do without God. Trust that what Jesus promised about “impossible” goals is truly “realistic”, enables us to think about not just what would be a little bit better, but about what would be perfect. and then to think about doing whatever we can think of to move in that direction, fully aware how feeble our own steps are, trusting God to open up new opportunities, in His time, as we walk with Him.

My own feeble steps were drafted into a bill in Iowa in 2020. The bill is posted at http://savetheworld.saltshaker.us/wiki/
Judicial_Accountability_Act:_How_Legislatures_can_stop_judges_from_legislating
Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Brad Zaun liked the idea and got it numbered and introduced, but it came to him too late that year to get it through the “funnel”, and he was disappointed that there was no organized group helping make other lawmakers aware of it.
Judicial Accountability Act: How Legislatures can stop judges from legislating

Summary: what the bill accomplishes
1. No district court injunctions. A single district judge can't overturn a law. Any legislature is well within its constitutional authority to prohibit any district court (lower court) from invalidating a law – only the Supreme Court should be allowed to do it, and only within 90 days. Letting a single lower court judge overturn the work of 150 lawmakers which include several attorneys and constitutional scholars is insane. Any challenge to a law should go directly to the most experienced judges in the state.
2. Supermajority required. It takes 5 of the 7 justices of the Supreme Court to overturn a law. A simple majority of justices overturning by one vote a law produced by tens of thousands of people over several years is a scandal. It has nothing to do with wisdom, law, or the Constitution. When judges can’t even agree with each other, unanimously, whether to destroy the work of the majority of voters and their representatives, they prove they are not so much wiser than everybody else in their state to be trusted with such unbridled power. At the very least any injunction should have their unanimous support before they should have any power to shut down the will of their whole state. A supermajority that is short of unanimous may be OK if it is not the final word but is followed by further opportunities for the legislature to restore their law.
3. Expedited. The Court has to rule in 3 months if the court blocks a new law from taking effect with a Temporary Restraining Order. If the court invalidates an existing law, the invalidation doesn't take effect for one year. Courts bottling up laws with injunctions for years while they make up their minds should make them ashamed. They don’t need years. No controversial law is passed without months if not years of scrutiny by attorneys for and against. Their briefs are already ready. They already know what the other side will say. They don’t need years to think of what to say or how to respond. Maybe a day. Maybe two.
Nor do judges need months to read the briefs for several weeks to bring themselves up to speed on the issue. The law has been in the news for years. There is no honor in willful ignorance of the issues until the first brief is filed.
Laws are passed to correct serious wrongs. Years of work costing millions of dollars goes into fixing problems. There is no good reason to delay justice for the citizens of a state for years to wait while judges try to agree among themselves whether to allow justice as understood by the majority of voters and lawmakers.
4. Discussion. The legislature may compel designated justices to attend a public hearing to debate the constitutionality of the law within one year of such a ruling, by passing a resolution. Provided a supermajority of the Supreme Court has agreed on an injunction in less than a month, the legislature should then be able, within the next year, to compel the attendance of judges under their jurisdiction to discuss and debate, with specified legislators in a public hearing, the constitutional justification for [or necessity of] that judicial exercise of the legislative function.
5. The legislature may overturn the invalidation by a 60% vote, by a resolution, leaving the last word, the final verdict, with incredibly well informed voters (through ordinary elections of lawmakers and retention of justices). The resolution overturning the invalidation would give reasons responsive to the reasoning of the judicial ruling.

The Bill: Iowa SSB3181 2020 AD'
A BILL FOR
1 An Act regarding legislative oversight of supreme court
2 decisions, and including applicability provisions.
3 BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF IOWA:
Introduction/Legislative Findings
1 Section 1. NEW SECTION. 602.1615 Legislative findings ——
2 challenges to the validity of a statute —— exclusive jurisdiction
3 —— public hearings —— legislative oversight.
4 1. The general assembly finds and declares all of the
5 following:
If the legislature can even impeach,
it can at least ask questions

6 a. The power to impeach subsumes reasonable less severe
7 remedies.
Lawmakers take an oath
to uphold the Constitution too
Their responsibility to uphold the Constitution
requires action against courts
that interfere with their responsibility
8 b. The intent of this section is to provide for a mechanism
9 in which to resolve disputes regarding the constitutionality of
10 laws between the courts and the legislature, both of which are
11 composed of constitutional scholars.
Jurisdiction of courts is
restricted by the legislature
12 c. Article 5, section 4 of the Constitution of the State
13 of Iowa states that the supreme court is “a court for the
14 correction of errors at law, under such restriction as the
15 general assembly may, by law, prescribe . . .”.
Judicial power to invalidate laws
is not given by the Iowa Constitution

16 d. Article 3, section 20 of the Constitution of the State
17 of Iowa gives the legislature the power to impeach judges for
18 “malfeasance in office”, which is generally defined to include
19 acting without authority and abusing power. The power to
20 impeach subsumes all lesser remedies.
21 e. The Constitution of the State of Iowa does not give the
22 courts of this state the power to invalidate laws enacted by
23 the legislature, to require the legislature to enact different
24 laws, or to publish rulings that have the same effect as new
25 legislation. Article 3, section 1 of the Constitution of
26 the State of Iowa states: “The powers of the government of
27 Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments —— the
28 legislative, the executive, and the judicial: and no person
29 charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
30 of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining
31 to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly
32 directed or permitted”.
The Legislature must get involved
when courts legislate unconstitutionally

33 f. Although the courts of Iowa have usurped those powers
34 without constitutional authority, it has been done for reasons
35 which the general assembly respects. The general assembly

1 welcomes the expertise and guidance of the courts in evaluating
2 the constitutionality of its laws. But when the reasoning of
3 rulings which function as legislation appears to be not only
4 unsound, but unconstitutional, the general assembly has the
5 constitutional duty and authority to determine that judges and
6 justices have abused their power and exceeded their authority,
7 which are grounds for impeachment under the malfeasance in
8 office clause.
9 g. A remedy short of impeachment should advance wisdom,
10 build consensus, and educate voters so that informed voters
11 may hold both judges and legislators accountable. Article 1,
12 section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Iowa states:
13 “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
14 instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the
15 people, and they have the right, at all times, to alter or
16 reform the same, whenever the public good may require it”.
The Meat of the Bill:

the Enforcement Section

Lower courts can't invalidate laws

17 2. The supreme court shall have discretionary and exclusive
18 original jurisdiction over any challenge to any law. A
19 district court or the court of appeals shall not invalidate a
20 law on any grounds.
Supreme Court must rule

within 3 months, by supermajority,
when the Court blocks a new law.
When the Court blocks an existing law

the block will not take effect for one year.

21 3. A decision of the supreme court that invalidates
22 existing law or has the effect of creating new law shall not
23 have any effect unless agreed to by five or more of the seven
24 justices, and otherwise shall not have any effect for one
25 year. The supreme court shall also have the power to suspend
26 implementation of a new law provided the supreme court produces
27 an expedited ruling within three months of the law’s enactment.
Public Hearing

28 4. a. Within one year of the date a supreme court decision
29 is published that invalidates existing law or has the effect
30 of creating new law, the general assembly may, by resolution,
31 compel the attendance of specified justices to a public hearing
32 to discuss and debate the justification for the decision with
33 members of the general assembly. A public record of the
34 hearing shall be made.
Impeachment grounds inquiry

35 b. During or after the hearing, the general assembly shall

1 determine if grounds to begin impeachment exist as to any
2 of the justices present at the hearing for acting without
3 authority or malfeasance in office.
Judges may improve their ruling
with respect to the status of the challenged law

4 c. Based on the results of a hearing commenced pursuant to
5 this subsection, a justice whose presence was required at the
6 hearing may change the justice’s vote or alter the justice’s
7 individual contribution to the decision.
Legislature may overturn court invalidation

8 5. A supreme court decision invalidating existing law or
9 having the effect of creating new law will not take effect if
10 two-thirds of both the senate and the house of representatives
11 approve a resolution to overturn the decision within one year
12 of the date the decision was published. The resolution must
13 specify the basis for overturning the decision, including
14 its reasoning, not to be limited by court precedent that is
15 responsive to the supreme court’s initial published decision,
16 and must be documented by expert testimony and constitutional
17 authority.
Legislature may add statement to the ruling

18 6. The general assembly may issue its own statement to a
19 published supreme court decision that invalidates existing law
20 or has the effect of creating new law if done within one year of
21 the date the decision was published. The statement must regard
22 the constitutionality of the invalidated existing law or the
23 newly created law.
24 Sec. 2. APPLICABILITY. This Act applies to decisions
25 published by the supreme court on or after the effective date
26 of this act.

FAQ's
Questions and Answers
Why are existing laws treated differently than new laws?
The difference is for the benefit of the public, so the laws governing them do not flip back and forth from being in effect. A new law – for example, the Heartbeat law – could be suspended by courts only until the suspension is overturned by the legislature. An existing law – for example our former marriage laws requiring spouses to be of the opposite sex – could not be suspended for one year, to give the legislature time to respond. No chaotic back and forth.

Could courts suspend a new law between its effective date and the court ruling?
The legal action a court takes to invalidate a law is an Injunction. The process here doesn’t specify it, but would allow the normal process of allowing the courts to immediately suspend a new law with a TRO, Temporary Restraining Order, until their hearing, at which the temporary order could become permanent. In the case of an existing law, by contrast, allowing the court to immediately suspend the law, with the possibility of it going back into effect after the legislature acts, would subject the public to a law which is in effect, then suspended, then back into effect.
If this law removed the court’s power to put a TRO on a new law, the law would take effect until the ruling, then it would be suspended, but then the legislature might give it effect again.
What will be the effect of a 4-3 ruling that a law is unconstitutional?
(Summary: no legal effect, but much political pressure) Although a 4-3 ruling would no longer have legal force, it would still have powerful political force. A ruling that a law is unconstitutional would be a public relations challenge for the legislature. The legislature would face pressure to refute the judges' claims point by point, or adjust the law voluntarily. A 4-3 ruling would not be powerless; and of course it would still be binding on the parties to the case. But an argument in defense of the legislature ignoring the challenge would be that after all, the justices themselves barely agree the law is unconstitutional.
Would a ruling always trigger a public hearing? That decision is made independently of a decision to vote to override the court. “Within one year, the legislature MAY, by a resolution, compel the attendance of specified Iowa judges ....”

Is one year for the legislature to act too long? Too short?
One year from the court’s ruling is needed to process the ruling’s reasoning, to hold hearings which would require passage of a resolution by both chambers, and then to schedule a vote, which could be while the legislature is not in session. A year is needed.
On the other hand, requiring courts to act in 3 months is reasonable, considering this is not a brand new question before them that they have never heard of before. They have had all the years of public debate on the issue to think about the issue. Plus, courts are accustomed to ruling quickly when cases are required to be “expedited”.
Would prolife laws do any better under this system?
Yes, along with all other laws relating to immorality, which are targeted by the Landmark Abomination Cases of the U.S. Supreme Court. Iowa courts think themselves bound by SCOTUS precedent, but the Iowa legislature is not and should not be.
The 14th Amendment makes state legislatures subject to federal laws which protect the rights of state citizens that are listed in the Constitution, which is the meaning of the “privileges and immunities” clause of the 14th. But the 14th gives SCOTUS no authority to make up “rights” hostile to enumerated rights, much less to enforce “rights” without waiting for federal law to lay out the manner and scope of protection.
Neither federal courts nor Congress have any authority through the 14th or through anything else to block states from protecting constitutional rights.
The Act laid out here will only get state courts out of the legislature’s way of protecting the rights of state citizens. When federal courts jump in the way, they can be shoved aside with the legal arguments of Clarence Thomas and others that are summarized in Statement #11 of this book.

Is a 2/3 majority requirement necessary? Shouldn't a simple majority of the legislature be enough to override courts?
(Summary: practically & legally, certainly; politically, complicated) This may be the hardest detail to muster a quick opinion. There are strong arguments for either choice; perhaps there is even a third option: a 60% vote. As this bill proceeds, perhaps it should be expected that a consensus will form later requiring amendment of this detail. The current draft requires a 2/3 majority.
The Practical Argument: Currently, courts get away with a simple majority requirement (4-3) which faces zero accountability from anybody. This draft requires a 5-2 vote; another option is 6-1. Should the legislature face a similar hurdle? Several lawmakers believe a 2/3 requirement removes any practical hope of ever overturning a judicial invalidation of a law, because the Iowa legislature is incapable of agreeing by 2/3 that the sun is up. A 2/3 requirement would make restraint of lawmaking judges actually harder than passing a constitutional amendment!
In Congress, our U.S. Constitution says a 2/3 majority is enough to send an amendment to the Constitution before the states for their ratification.
But if we let the legislature overturn the court’s invalidation with a second simple majority, it could be objected that would be almost ridiculously easy for the legislature to gather together the same “yea” votes a second time (if an election doesn’t intervene). A 60% requirement could answer that concern.
However, that objection could also be met by pointing out that the ruling of the courts would give typically 60 pages of reasons the law should be overturned, which would put a lot of pressure on those “yea” votes to either eloquently and exhaustively justify their votes or vote “nay”. It would not be easy to secure a majority a second time under that pressure.
The public hearing option would put that 60 page ruling on a level playing field with reasoning from lawmakers. It would make both legislatures and courts accountable not only to each other, but to reason. It might even make lawmakers upset enough to reach a 2/3 agreement.
Voters, informed as has never before been possible about judges on the ballot, or about the legal skills of lawmakers, would have the last word.
The Political Argument: The public is not used to legislatures having ANY power to correct unconstitutional rulings. A 2/3 requirement would be less of a shock to tradition. Were this bill to pass into law with a 2/3 requirement, and lawmakers saw how unnecessary it was, lawmakers could ease the requirement in the future - since this does not require amending the constitution, which already grants more than this power, but requires only a law.
Amendment. Should it be decided that a simple majority of the legislature to overturn a court’s invalidation is sufficient, here is the simple change that could do it - simply strike out “two-thirds of” (or replace it with “six tenths of”):
8 A supreme court decision invalidating existing law or
9 having the effect of creating new law will not take effect if
10 <strikethrough>two-thirds of</strikethrough> both the senate and the house of representatives
11 approve a resolution to overturn the decision within one year
12 of the date the decision was published.
Is it practically possible to require courts to add a statement from the legislature up to a year after its ruling?
When the Supreme Court first publishes its ruling, that is not the final version that will be later given an official permanent citation in the Northwest Reporter series. (Their contact information) Unpredictable delays are caused by litigants asking for rehearings, and courts taking time to respond. Even after that option is exhausted, court staff continue proofing their decisions, a process that can take months. [Iowa Supreme Court Clerk phone number: 515-348-4700] Northwest Reporter doesn’t officially publish a case, and give it a permanent citation, until a state supreme court notifies them that it is ready. That is why a new case has only an Iowa citation that does not list a page number or volume number, and doesn’t get a fancy N.W.2d permanent citation until much later.
Requiring the Court to leave the publication open for a year in case the legislature chooses to submit a statement would affect only the time the Court notifies Northwest Reporter, and it may not even affect that time at all.
The farther this bill gets, the more discussions there will be about it with the Iowa Bar Association and the Court itself. If delaying final publication that long is deemed unreasonable, an amendment could easily give the legislature an earlier deadline. It might also require the legislature to notify the court of an intent to exercise that option.
Of course, this entire final sentence of this bill is not critical to legislative correction of judicial overreach. It could be conceded if necessary to save the rest of the bill. But it is an appropriate correction of the current system.

Will an expedited hearing that begins in the Supreme Court diminish the time needed by the litigants to fully present their claims?
(Summary: anyone ready to block a law from taking effect is ready for court) A challenge to a new law means (and perhaps this bill could so specify, although I think it is already clearly implied) a challenge to a law that has not yet gone into effect, to keep it from going into effect (beginning with a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) the day it would go into effect).
In such a case the state itself will normally be the defendant, and the petitioner will be a well funded group that tried to kill the law in the legislature but failed. In that situation the petitioner will already be prepared legally, their arguments well honed through interaction with lawmakers. It is hard to imagine that any less prepared petitioner would be ready with a TRO to stop a law before it goes into effect.
Iowa court rules already require appellants to outline their issues in their initial notice of appeal, which is more pressure on individual defendants to prepare that far ahead, in proportion to their means, than challengers to a new law will face, who will be fully primed for a court battle before the law passes the first chamber.
&nbspCourt rules already require that any issue argued in the Supreme Court must have first been raised in the district court, so any responsible lawyer in district court will already be prepared for the Supreme Court.
&nbspDistrict courts are needed to develop facts through witnesses in front of juries, depositions, and cross examination of expert witnesses. Supreme courts don’t do any of that. Expert witnesses can submit Amicus Briefs but the other side can’t cross examine them. Although judges can cross examine the lawyers for both parties in oral arguments, which district judges don’t do.
&nbspThus district courts are essential in criminal trials where the guilt of the defendant needs to be proved to juries, and in civil trials between two parties. But their value in a challenge to a law is less clear. A legislature’s “findings of facts” are given deference except in the case of a “fundamental right”, under current practice, but the court practice of overturning laws that violate made-up “fundamental rights” has zero authority under the U.S. Constitution, and nothing prevents state legislatures from copying into state law the provision of the U.S. Constitution in Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 2, that court jurisdiction is subject to such “exceptions” and “regulations” as the legislature enacts.
&nbspWere the petitioner an individual seeking relief only for himself and not for anyone else affected by the law, courts have many tools for giving relief to individuals short of invalidating whole laws. For example, extenuating circumstances, interaction with other laws affecting the individual, or necessity in order to avoid serious injury (Iowa 704). The applicability of laws to individuals is the jurisdiction of the judicial branch, with which the legislative branch has no intent to interfere, any more than the judicial branch should interfere with the jurisdiction of the legislative branch to establish laws of general application.
&nbspAfter a law has already gone into effect, then there is no requirement to expedite. In fact, the decision to challenge a law could be made by the parties to the case, or by a judge, at any point during a years-long case: in pre-trial briefs, a district judge’s ruling, or during the appeal before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. With this bill the applicability of the law to the individual defendant could still be suspended, but the law itself, as applied to everyone else, would not be suspended until after the Supreme Court so rules and then only if the legislature does not block the suspension. The legislature’s year to respond would not begin with any ruling made before the Supreme Court’s supermajority ruling.

Are there any U.S. Supreme Court precedents relevant to these half dozen powers?
(Summary: making judges answer lawmakers' questions is a staple of confirmation hearings) These proposed powers are all completely unprecedented in law, although some of them have been discussed. Probably the one never before discussed is the idea of a public hearing.
&nbspSurely the prohibition of a district judge overturning a law, limiting that power to the state Supreme Court, and requiring a supermajority of the court to overturn, is well within the power given the legislature to limit the jurisdiction of courts.
&nbspPublic Hearings
How about public hearings? Is there any legal or constitutional principle that shields judges from having to explain their rulings any better than they do in their written opinions? Is there something nefarious about requiring judges to answer questions? Federal judges answer questions about their past rulings in confirmation hearings for appointments to higher courts. If U.S. Senators can require them to answer questions about their rulings years later, why can’t state legislatures require their state judges to answer questions at the time? Judges justify not answering questions about future potential cases, that they may remain free to rule in view of facts and arguments they might not see until then, but there is no reason to shield judges from explaining their past cases.
Especially since the Public Hearings envisioned in this bill are not only to clarify whether a law ruled unconstitutional actually is unconstitutional. The second purpose of these Public Hearings is to investigate whether there are grounds for impeachment. Because if the legislature determines that the court’s ruling of the law’s unconstitutionality is utterly lacking in merit, then judges who so ruled were legislating; they were acting without authority, exercising a power of a different branch of government than their own, which is malfeasance of office, an impeachable offense.
Obviously, in any impeachment trial, the judges would be required to answer questions. These public hearings are a power subsumed under the power of impeachment; they are a reasonable, less severe remedy.
Certainly the very idea of communication between lawmakers and judges on a “level playing field” is unheard of. Unprecedented. (Outside confirmation hearings.) Current communication, which tradition will be slow to reconsider, is somewhat like a parent trying to reason with a child who is as inarticulate as he is stubborn.
It is a special challenge for a lawyer representing the legislature to reason with a judge who gives only the scantest clues to what is on his mind before he rules, after which it is too late to respond to his errors. Does any Constitutional or legal principle require such a breakdown of communication? Does this ritual serve any good purpose?
Once President Washington asked SCOTUS for its advisory interpretation of a treaty. The justices declined, saying “The lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of government – their being in certain respects checks upon each other – and our being judges in a court of last resort – are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra judicially deciding the questions alluded to; especially as the Power given by the Constitution to the President of calling on the Heads of Departments for opinions, seems to have been purposely as well as expressly limited to executive departments.” https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/george-washington-and-the-supreme-court/
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=Thomas%20Recipient%3A%22Washington%2C%20George%22%20Author%3A%22Supreme%20Court%20Justices%22&s=1111311111&sa=supre&r=3&sr=
That answer is not a precedent for keeping courts from communicatint with legislatures for two reasons: (1) it was not a sensible answer then. The Constitution puts no limit on who the President can consult for advice, while Proverbs 15:22 says “in a multitude of counsellors, purposes are established”. I can’t imagine where SCOTUS came up with the idea that the President was limited to asking his department heads. Washington asked for advice, not a binding ruling. That’s what “extrajudicial” means. (2) SCOTUS then declined to get involved in an issue which it otherwise would never face. This is different than asking a Court to make up its mind earlier than later.
It is not wrong to ask judges to give advisory opinions to lawmakers so lawmakers don’t have to spend years crafting laws which judges at the last minute decide to overturn. The August 8, 1793 answer was before Americans had to worry about activist judges who leave the future of legislation, and indeed the very future of human rights, very much in doubt. However, asking judges to give an advisory opinion about a law before it is passed is probably impractical, since judges are used to taking longer to study an issue than a legislature is in session, and also since even after giving an early opinion, new evidence or argument might come later which would flip the Court’s ruling.
An expedited three month deadline is probably the closest we can come to a timely response from courts. Certainly legal wrangling that dribbles on for years exhausts the patience of rational minds.
The subject of the public hearing is whether the law really was unconstitutional. Because if it wasn't, then the judges plainly acted outside their authority, which is grounds for impeachment. But beyond being grounds for impeachment, an order given that is beyond one's authority to give is legally invalid. So surely the legislature has the authority to investigate whether an order was invalid, and upon establishing that it is, to reverse its effects.
Sheltering judges from interaction doesn’t make them free of bias. In every other human interaction, accountability is the best way to cleanse a hard heart of bias.
&nbspThe Two-Thirds Majority
The only thing remotely relevant to this 2/3 vs. simple majority requirement in American constitutional law that I can think of is that to ratify a constitutional amendment, Congress has to pass it by 2/3 before states pass it by 3/4. But the solution here doesn’t change the constitution; it only defines how the legislature is choosing to exercise authority already given by the Iowa Constitution.
If anything, there is a constitutional principle favoring the power of legislatures over courts, with respect to Fundamental Rights. The 14th Amendment is the part of the Constitution which courts have taken to give them jurisdiction over states who trample fundamental rights. But who did the 14th Amendment authorize to enforce its provisions? Not courts! Rather, Congress, according to Section 5 of the Amendment.
Yet here are examples of not just state laws, but even state constitutional amendments, which were overturned by courts for violating the “equal protection” clause of the 14th Amendment:
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) a Missouri oath to hold office designed to keep out former confederate soldiers was ruled an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) a California same sex marriage ban. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) a Colorado gay rights ban.
Awad v. Ziriax, 10th Circuit, January 10, 2012 an Oklahoma ban of the use of Sharia Law in court.
Giles v. Harris, 1903, and Giles v. Teasley, 1904, courts winked at disenfranchising Blacks, but explicitly accepted jurisdiction over state constitutions violating the 14th and 15th Amendments.
The authority to enforce the requirements of the 14th Amendment, given to Congress and not courts, gives Congress also the authority to define and apply fundamental rights, and for anyone seriously in doubt, to clarify who is a human being and therefore deserves to have his fundamental rights protected.
These are philosophical as well as legal questions which merit national discussion, but while courts are sheltered from having to talk to anybody the conversation has been one sided. America needs to open this up into what Proverbs 15:22 calls a “multitude of counsellors”. It does not undermine respect for the judiciary to imagine judges are able to explain their reasoning.
If Legislatures overturn court rulings, won’t they exercise the authority of the judicial branch?
(Summary: legislative action wouldn't affect litigants; only the part of the ruling that reaches wrongfully into legislating) No. On that future day when a legislature overturns judicial rulings, the legislature’s action would not apply to the parties to the case, so the “separation of powers” aspect of the ruling is untouched.
There are several reasons a court may exempt a litigant from the effects of a law, without invalidating the law for everyone else. The simple difference between courts and legislatures is that legislatures pass laws which apply to everybody, while courts apply those laws in specific cases, only to the parties to the case, guided by the special facts and circumstances of the case. The power given by this bill to legislatures to overturn rulings applies only to the part of the ruling where the court stepped outside its constitutional authority in order to nullify a law passed for the benefit of millions of others.
The purpose of the public hearing is only for the legislature to investigate whether their law was constitutional after all, and if so, to take back their constitutional authority to pass laws by their subsequent vote.
Lawmakers take oaths to defend the Constitution too. Courts cannot rob lawmakers of their power to obey the Constitution without violating the constitution themselves. Perhaps that is the key principle declared implicitly by this bill: judges aren’t the only branch of government authorized to understand and defend the Constitution. The other branches are too. That balance needs to be restored. The conversation needed needs to be among equals.

Shouldn’t judges be immune from popular pressure? We don’t want our rights subject to a vote!
Neither legislatures nor courts should have the last word over each other. We have seen what happens when legislatures had the last word, in the South, during the time of slavery. And we have seen what happens when courts had the last word, in 1857 and 1973; regarding slavery and abortion.
Even the Iowa constitution gives the last word to voters. Is that dangerous? America’s Founders talked about popular whims that could remove important protections over the weekend if the public could vote on individual issues continually. They set up 6 year terms for U.S. Senators and 4 year terms for presidents explicitly to shield our Rule of Law from whims the public might hold for only a month. Nor does this process give voters direct control over the outcome of a disputed law, but only equips them to evaluate the wisdom of their elected representatives and their judges, which is the same as our current system except this leaves voters much better informed.
The 14th Amendment expanded the power of courts to overturn laws which violate “fundamental rights”. It made slave-loving southern state legislatures accountable to courts. Unaddressed was what to do when it is courts which violate fundamental rights. This measure is an attempt to restore balance. It is interesting that the 14th Amendment actually leaves its own enforcement not to courts, but to Congress.
The “independence of the judiciary” from popular whims is well protected by lifetime tenure. This measure does not change that. It only defines a remedy for Iowans when judges rule lawlessly and unconstitutionally.

Didn’t Iowa decide recently not to impeach judges for their rulings? Summary: “Overreaching” can only reach so far before it turns into full fledged unconstitutional legislating.
Removal from office, for just one harmful ruling which may be out of a long career of beneficial rulings, is pretty drastic; not to mention ineffective since it leaves the ruling in place that triggered the impeachment!
That is why remedies short of impeachment are necessary, as well as remedies able to focus on the problem without cutting off talent which is mostly beneficial. If an assembly line produces an occasional klunker amongst its generally great output, we keep the assembly line and discard the klunker; we don't keep the klunker and blow up the assembly line!
Iowans seriously considered impeaching judges for their rulings not so long ago. Highlights are discussed at the Brennan Center:

A 2011 review by the National Center for State Courts’ Gavel to Gavel website also found numerous bills introduced in state legislatures that year to impeach judges and justices because of disagreement over specific rulings. Several of those introductions were part of a failed effort in Iowa to remove four Iowa Supreme Court Justices for their decision in a high-profile case about marriage rights for same-sex couples.
The impeachment attempt garnered significant media attention, but also widespread condemnation – even from members of the sponsors’ own party. Iowa Governor-elect Terry Brandstad (R) [sic] said at the time that disagreement over a ruling did not constitute grounds for impeachment. “There’s a difference between malfeasance and over-reaching,” said Brandstad, “the Constitution says what the grounds for impeachment are. My reading is it’s not there.” Iowa House Speaker Kraig Paulsen (R), whose chamber would have voted on the impeachment, sent the resolutions to languish in an inactive committee and said, “I disagree with this remedy,…I do not expect it to be debated on the floor of the House, and if it is, I will vote no.”

I respectfully disagree with Governor, later Ambassador Branstad. When the Iowa Supreme Court not only struck down laws limiting marriage to opposite sex couples, but specifically ordered county clerks to solemnize “marriages” between same sex couples, that reaches beyond “overreaching”. “Overreaching” implies a mild going-a-little-too-far out of one’s proper jurisdiction.
But if the plainest example of a “person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to” the judicial branch of government exercising “any function appertaining to” the legislative branch can be dismissed as mere “overreaching”, then it is impossible for any other judicial legislating to violate the Iowa Constitution. We might as well just give judges the password to the Iowa Code database and let them write whatever laws they please. As Rep. Matt Windschitl said January 27, 2020 on the Jeff Angelo show, “Do we really want judges deciding laws? If so, why do we even have a legislature?” Article 3 Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution says “Departments of government. The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments — the legislative, the executive, and the judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others....”

FAQ’s: Judicial Philosophy

Isn’t it unconstitutional to impeach a judge for a ruling? Summary: It can’t be unconstitutional to correct the part of a ruling that unconstitutionally legislates. Although it has not been established definitively, whether a judge may be impeached over a ruling, most legal discussion avers that would be unethical, and there is no precedent of a successful impeachment over the content of a ruling. Most legal discussion is of the U.S. Constitution; the Iowa Constitution specifies that judges can’t legislate, which is only implied in the U.S. Constitution.
The United States Constitution provides little guidance as to what offenses constitute grounds for the impeachment of federal judges...However, the impeachment power has historically been limited to cases of serious ethical or criminal misconduct. - Brennan Center
It is generally supposed that legislative action to correct an unconstitutional ruling, or to discipline a judge who writes one, would be unconstitutional.
The Constitution does not “provide for resignation or impeachment whenever a judge makes a decision with which elected officials disagree” said four judges when President Clinton and Senator Dole urged impeachment of a judge over his ruling on admissibility of evidence. “These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent judiciary and…mislead the public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy.” Brennan Center
Let’s make a distinction glossed over by those four judges: between a ruling hated because it applies existing law and facts in a way most people think is wrong, and a ruling hated because it overturns laws by a rationale that most people think is unconstitutional. I agree with the four judges that the case was correctly kept off limits to lawmakers, but the judges generalized their criticism to the extent of dismissing concerns about truly unconstitutional rulings as being mere decisions “with which elected officials disagree”. It is that degree of generalization that is “a grave disservice” by elevating “the principle of an independent judiciary” beyond the reach of the Constitution, of common sense, and of accountability of any kind from any source.
What I have not found in law review articles is any proposed remedy for when a ruling itself is unconstitutional. I have not found it even acknowledged that it is possible for a ruling to be unconstitutional. As if to say “how could judges rule unconstitutionally? Judges ARE the constitution.”
But it is judges themselves, in vigorous dissents, who stir public concern about the constitutionally of certain rulings. Judges who write dissents are as qualified as those in the majority, and their reasoning is often equally persuasive. When the public has a basis this solid for concern about the constitutionality of rulings, it is surely in the public interest, and not contrary to any known legal or constitutional principle, to hold a public hearing where those concerns can be addressed and hopefully resolved, where judges, perhaps for the first time in America history, can be compelled to interact with experts other than each other.
In fact, any time a law is overturned for being unconstitutional, but the ruling is flawed and a correct ruling would actually not find the law unconstitutional, then actually the ruling itself is unconstitutional because the ruling amounts to raw legislation. It is unconstitutional for courts to pass laws.
Let me emphasize this point. Any ruling that overturns a law is either correct because the law is in fact unconstitutional, or is itself unconstitutional because its reasoning or factual basis is flawed. Lawmakers take oaths to defend the Constitution too, and should not be unconstitutionally deprived of the power to enforce it when they see a violation.
If we may agree that it is at least theoretically possible for a ruling overturning a law to be unconstitutional, shall we insist the Constitution requires the legislature to honor every unconstitutional ruling?
Suppose there were a law against painting your house red, someone was prosecuted for painting his house red, and the court refused to convict because it is surely unconstitutional to outlaw painting your house red. Even without a formal nullification of the law, the law would be defacto nullified because prosecutors would know the court won’t convict anybody for that crime. It may be reasoned that rulings overturning laws merely formalize this natural process.
Public hearings would bring healing to our national division over issues less clear than the right to paint your house red.
As is pointed out below, the power this bill gives the legislature to overturn a judicial validation of its laws would not usurp judicial powers. It would not affect individuals who are actual parties named in the case. It would only affect that part of the ruling which wrongfully reaches into lawmaking, changing the laws which affect millions of other people who are not named in the case.

[3] More about “similar grounds for disciplinary action”
For example, see “Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution” at www.osaka.law.miami.edu/~schnably/GringrichContractWith America.pdf (sic)

[4] More about “Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress, not courts, the authority to correct state violations of the Right to Life and of Equal Protection of the Laws”
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment so plainly gives Congress, not courts, the power to correct state violations of fundamental rights, that it is an amazing story how SCOTUS has usurped that power for itself and completely denied it to Congress, and how Congress has let them.
Largely relying on the dissents and concurrences of Justice Clarence Thomas, this story is told in Statement #11 and its footnotes. See “What Happened to Unalienable Rights, and How to Get Them Back” and “ ‘Substantive Due Process’: how SCOTUS usurped the Constitution’s Authority to Define Rights, and Congress’ Authority to Enforce Rights, into its own authority to reclassify abominations as ‘rights’ ”

[5] More about “...definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ apply ‘to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.’ ”
“A crime against humanity occurs
when the government withdraws legal protection
from a class of human beings
resulting in severe deprivation of rights,
up to and including death.”
- amicus in Dobbs of Melinda Thybault/Moral Outcry
Melinda Thybault’s amicus brief was the 20th amicus docketed in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022). (www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-1392/184968/ 20210726175018044_41206%20pdf%20Parker%20III%20br.pdf)
Her references, backing up that damning judgment:
See “Crime Against Humanity” at www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ crime_against_humanity and see U.N. Office, Genocide Prevention, Crimes Against Humanity www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml; Treaty of Rome (1957). See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War .

Her characterization of international documents is not only fair, but it understates the culpability of elected representatives. Actual quotes from the documents lay responsibility at the feet, not just of impersonal “government”, but of government’s “representatives”.
Notice in the following definitions that those targeted for prosecution in international human rights tribunals include elected representatives and senators who “tolerate” crimes against humanity – who don’t actively execute their authority to criminalize these assaults on the Image of God. (Genesis 1:27)
“Genocide”, defined: “Genocide means...acts...with intent to destroy...in part, a national...group [in our case, Americans] [by] killing members of the group [in our case, babies; and by] Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group....” Here is the complete United Nations statement:

Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide / Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 / Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XII / www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.pdf

The 1948 definition above is cited in the following 1968 United Nations General Assembly resolution (which took effect two years later) which nullifies any “statute of limitations” on “crimes against humanity”:

Article I: No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of their commission:...(b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations,...the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.

The following Article II applies the call for prosecution at any time, not limited by a Statute of Limitations, to elected representatives. The word “elected” is not there, but the context certainly includes them, especially since one cannot “represent” another, as the word is normally defined, without their voluntary authorization.
By not limiting the definition of “representatives” to those who are elected, the definition does not exclude judges.

Article II: If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this Convention shall apply to representatives of the State authority and private individuals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly incite others to the commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission. (Article II, Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War, ADOPTED 26 November 1968 BY General Assembly resolution 2391 (XXIII))

If [genocide] is committed,
the provisions of this Convention shall apply
to representatives of the State authority
who tolerate [its] commission.

Including judges.
And elected representatives
who are lax in restraining them.
Thybault writes, “...the Court has not yet fully reversed Roe, Doe, and Casey.” She submitted this observation to the Court which finally reversed all three, technically, although the slaughter continues in most states so her observation is still timely. “No American citizen should have to live under, nor as history tragically demonstrates, should they stand by silently, while their government sanctions and even promotes crimes against humanity.” Another low point in the Supreme Court’s grasp of 14th Amendment equal rights, she mentions, was Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) which, like Roe and Dred Scott, “denied legal protection to a class of human beings” and “ignored the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment”. “Plessy accepted the gloss that ‘separate but equal’ was ‘equal’.”
She repeats, “When the government withdraws legal protection from a class of human beings, it is the classic definition of a crime against humanity.”

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

@@ Line 326: / Line 326: @@
 </ref>
-<span style="color:blue">Should any federal judge so interfere, this state appeals to its congressional delegation to examine similar grounds for disciplinary action, along with exercising its Article III, Section 2, paragraph 2 authority to make “exceptions” and “regulations” designed to end SCOTUS’ long line of landmark abomination cases.3
+<span style="color:blue">Should any federal judge so interfere, this state appeals to its congressional delegation to examine similar grounds for disciplinary action, along with exercising its Article III, Section 2, paragraph 2 authority to make “exceptions” and “regulations” designed to end SCOTUS’ long line of landmark abomination cases.
-<ref>
+<ref>More about '''“similar grounds for disciplinary action”'''
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For example, see  “Bringing the Courts Back Under the Constitution” at www.osaka.law.miami.edu/~schnably/GringrichContractWith America.pdf  (sic)
 </ref>
-<span style="color:blue">This state also appeals to its congressional delegation to exercise its life-saving and rights-protecting authority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment whose plain words give Congress, not courts, the authority to correct state violations of Rights,4 which subsumes the authority to define their scope and balance competing interests, while the “privileges and immunities” clause identifies as protectable rights those listed in the Constitution.4
+<span style="color:blue">This state also appeals to its congressional delegation to exercise its life-saving and rights-protecting authority under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment whose plain words give Congress, not courts, the authority to correct state violations of Rights,4 which subsumes the authority to define their scope and balance competing interests, while the “privileges and immunities” clause identifies as protectable rights those listed in the Constitution.
-<ref>
+<ref> More about '''“Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress, not courts, the authority to correct state violations of the Right to Life and of Equal Protection of the Laws”'''
-</ref>
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Section 5 of the 14th Amendment so plainly gives Congress, not courts, the power to correct state violations of fundamental rights, that it is an amazing story how SCOTUS has usurped that power for itself and completely denied it to Congress, and how Congress has let them.
-<span style="color:blue">Official world-wide definitions of “crimes against humanity” apply “to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.”5
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Largely relying on the dissents and concurrences of Justice Clarence Thomas, this story is told in Statement #11 and its footnotes. See  “What Happened to Unalienable Rights, and How to Get Them Back” and  “ ‘Substantive Due Process’: how SCOTUS usurped the Constitution’s Authority to Define Rights, and Congress’ Authority to Enforce Rights, into its own authority to reclassify abominations as ‘rights’ ”</ref>
-<ref>
+<span style="color:blue">Official world-wide definitions of “crimes against humanity” apply “to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.”
+<ref>More about '''“...definitions of ‘crimes against humanity’ apply ‘to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.’ ”'''
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;“A crime against humanity occurs
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;when the government withdraws legal protection
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;from a class of human beings
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;resulting in severe deprivation of rights,
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;up to and including death.”
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;- amicus in Dobbs of <u>Melinda Thybault/Moral Outcry</u>
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Melinda Thybault’s amicus brief was the 20th amicus docketed in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022). (www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-1392/184968/ 20210726175018044_41206%20pdf%20Parker%20III%20br.pdf)
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Her references, backing up that damning judgment:
+<blockquote>See “Crime Against Humanity” at www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ crime_against_humanity and see U.N. Office, Genocide Prevention, Crimes Against Humanity www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/crimes-against-humanity.shtml; Treaty of Rome (1957). See also Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War .</blockquote>
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Her characterization of international documents is not only fair, but it understates the culpability of elected representatives. Actual quotes from the documents lay responsibility at the feet, not just of impersonal “government”, but of government’s “representatives”.
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Notice in the following definitions that those targeted for prosecution in international human rights tribunals include elected representatives and senators who “tolerate” crimes against humanity – who don’t actively execute their authority to criminalize these assaults on the Image of God. (Genesis 1:27)
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;“Genocide”, defined: ''“Genocide means...acts...with intent to destroy...in part, a national...group [in our case, Americans] [by] killing members of the group [in our case, babies; and by] Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group....”''
+Here is the complete United Nations statement:
+<blockquote><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Article II: In the present Convention, '''genocide means''' any of the following '''acts committed with intent to destroy''', in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(a) '''Killing members of the group;'''
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(d) '''Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;'''
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide / Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 / Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XII / www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.pdf</blockquote>
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The 1948 definition above is cited in the following 1968 United Nations General Assembly resolution (which took effect two years later) which nullifies any “statute of limitations” on “crimes against humanity”:
+<blockquote>
+Article I: No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of their commission:...(b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations,...the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.</blockquote>
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The following Article II applies the call for prosecution at any time, not limited by a Statute of Limitations, to elected representatives. The word “elected” is not there, but the context certainly includes them, especially since one cannot “represent” another, as the word is normally defined, without their voluntary authorization.
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;By not limiting the definition of “representatives” to those who are elected, the definition does not exclude judges.
+<blockquote>Article II: '''If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this Convention shall apply to''' representatives of the State authority and private individuals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly incite others to the commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to '''representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.''' (Article II, Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War, ADOPTED 26 November 1968 BY General Assembly resolution 2391 (XXIII))</blockquote>
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;If [genocide] is committed,
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the provisions of this Convention shall apply
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to representatives of the State authority
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;who tolerate [its] commission.
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Including judges.
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;And elected representatives
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;    who are lax in restraining them.
+<u>Thybault</u> writes, “...the Court has not yet fully reversed Roe, Doe, and Casey.” She submitted this observation to the Court which finally reversed all three, technically, although the slaughter continues in most states so her observation is still timely.
+“No American citizen should have to live under, nor as history tragically demonstrates, should they stand by silently, while their government sanctions and even promotes crimes against humanity.”
+Another low point in the Supreme Court’s grasp of 14th Amendment equal rights, she mentions, was Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) which, like Roe and Dred Scott, “denied legal protection to a class of human beings” and “ignored the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment”. “Plessy accepted the gloss that ‘separate but equal’ was ‘equal’.”
+<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;She repeats, “When the government withdraws legal protection from a class of human beings, it is the classic definition of a crime against humanity.”
 </ref>
 <span style="color:blue">Any court review of this law must be expedited, because lives are lost with each day that courts delay.

Difference between revisions of "Statement 12 + Footnotes"

Revision as of 05:01, 13 December 2023

Reversing_Landmark_Abomination_Cases

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