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     This article was started by Dave Leach R-IA Bible Lover-musician-grandpa (talk) 18:07, 5 November 2024 (UTC))
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Underlined words are proposed additions. Strikethrough words are proposed deletions. In sections where no changes are proposed, the section number is given without any of its text. For a complete copy of Iowa Divorce Law, see Iowa 598. [Explanations are in italics in brackets.] Adding a numbered section requires renumbering the following sections, but renumbering is not indicated here so you can see the existing numbering.

598.1 Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

1. “Best interest of the child” includes but is not limited to the opportunity for maximum continuous physical and emotional contact possible with both parents, unless direct physical or significant emotional harm to the child may result from this contact. “Maximum continuous physical and emotional contact possible with both parents” is obviously achieved by healing the marriage bonds. Refusal by one parent to provide this opportunity without just cause shall be considered harmful to the best interest of the child.

2. “Competent Evidence” means relevant evidence supporting the statutory requirement for dissolution, which is subject to rebuttal evidence from the opposing party.

[U.S.Legal.con: The term ‘competent evidence’ is used to refer evidence that is relevant, and of such nature that it can be received by a court of law. It refers to evidence that is appropriate and needed to prove the issue of fact that the parties have made. Competent evidence may also serve as a link to the subject matter that is to be proved. Competent evidence is also known as proper evidence, admissible evidence, relevant evidence, or legal evidence.

Rebuttable evidence refers to any evidence that repels, counteracts, or disproves evidence given by a witness or adverse party. Rebuttable evidence is offered by a party after the presentation of both sides' evidence. The purpose is to contradict the opposed party’s evidence. “Rebuttal evidence” is, as its name indicates, that which tends to explain or contradict or disprove evidence offered by the adverse party..]

2. “Dissolution of marriage” means a termination of the marriage relationship and shall be synonymous with the term “divorce”.

3. “Domestic abuse” means a record of documented, deliberately caused serious injury of any family member. For purposes of dissolution proceedings, it does not include legal records of child abuse or spousal abuse that lack confirmation of serious physical injury by a medical doctor.

3. “Joint custody” or “joint legal custody” means an award of legal custody of a minor child to both parents jointly under which both parents have legal custodial rights and responsibilities toward the child and under which neither parent has legal custodial rights superior to those of the other parent. Rights and responsibilities of joint legal custody include but are not limited to equal participation in decisions affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.

4. “Joint physical care” means an award of physical care of a minor child to both joint legal custodial parents under which both parents have rights and responsibilities toward the child including but not limited to shared parenting time with the child, maintaining homes for the child, providing routine care for the child and under which neither parent has physical care rights superior to those of the other parent.

5. “Legal custody” or “custody” means an award of the rights of legal custody of a minor child to a parent under which a parent has legal custodial rights and responsibilities toward the child. Rights and responsibilities of legal custody include but are not limited to decision making affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.

6. “Legitimate Objects of Matrimony” include

a. the best interests of any children, including the“Maximum continuous physical and emotional contact possible with both parents”

b. enabling the family's pool of mutually beneficial talents to enrich the family,

c. creating a family heritage,

d. nurturing honesty, reasonableness, commitment and responsibility in all family members,

e. the happiness and best interests of all family members,

f. the moral order and peace of society [listed in Craft v. Craft]

The “legitimate objects of matrimony” are considered “destroyed” only when the preponderance of competent evidence shows that these purposes, taken as a whole, are constricted by the marriage, would be furthered by dissolution, and that this condition is irreversible.

6. “Minor child” means any person under legal age.

7. “Physical care” means the right and responsibility to maintain a home for the minor child and provide for the routine care of the child.

8. “Postsecondary education subsidy” means an amount which either of the parties may be required to pay under a temporary order or final judgment or decree for educational expenses of a child who is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two years if the child is regularly attending a course of career and technical training either as a part of a regular school program or under special arrangements adapted to the individual person’s needs; or is, in good faith, a full-time student in a college, university, or community college; or has been accepted for admission to a college, university, or community college and the next regular term has not yet begun.

9. “Support” or “support payments” means an amount which the court may require either of the parties to pay under a temporary order or a final judgment or decree, and may include alimony, child support, maintenance, and any other term used to describe these obligations. For orders entered on or after July 1, 1990, unless the court specifically orders otherwise, medical support is not included in the monetary amount of child support. The obligations shall include support for a child who is between the ages of eighteen and nineteen years who is engaged full-time in completing high school graduation or equivalency requirements in a manner which is reasonably expected to result in completion of the requirements prior to the person reaching nineteen years of age; and may include support for a child of any age who is dependent on the parties to the dissolution proceedings because of physical or mental disability.

598.2 Jurisdiction and venue.

598.2A Choice of law.

598.3 Kind of action — joinder.

An action for dissolution of marriage shall be by equitable proceedings, and no cause of action, save for alimony, shall be joined therewith. Such actions shall not be subject to counterclaim or cross petition by the respondent except to rebut the claim that there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved, and to propose remedial measures with which the court may assist. After the appearance of the respondent, no dismissal of the cause of action shall be allowed unless both the petitioner and the respondent sign the dismissal, although the court may recommend dismissal if the court is not satisfied from the evidence presented that the marriage cannot be preserved.

(See quotes from Craft v. Craft. This existing section contradicts the section which says the court must be satisfied from the evidence presented that the marriage can’t be preserved.)

598.4 Caption of petition for dissolution.

598.5 Contents of petition — verification — evidence.

1. The petition for dissolution of marriage shall:

a. State the name, birth date, address and county of residence of the petitioner and the name and address of the petitioner’s attorney.

b. State the place and date of marriage of the parties.

c. State the name, birth date, address and county of residence, if known, of the respondent.

d. State the name and age of each minor child by date of birth whose welfare may be affected by the controversy.

e. State whether or not a separate action for dissolution of marriage or child support has been commenced and whether such action is pending in any court in this state or elsewhere. State whether the entry of an order would violate 28 U.S.C. §1738B. If there is an existingn child support order, the party shall disclose identifying information regarding the order.

f. Allege that the petition has been filed in good faith and for the purposes set forth therein.

g. Allege that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony, including but not limited to serving the best interests of any children, preserving the family finances, enabling the family's pool of mutually beneficial talents to enrich the family, creating a family heritage, and fulfilling commitments and responsibilities, have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.

h. Set forth any application for temporary support of the petitioner and any children without enumerating the amounts thereof.

i. Set forth any application for permanent alimony or support, child custody, or disposition of property, as well as attorney fees and suit money, without enumerating the amounts thereof.

j. State whether the appointment of a conciliator pursuant to section 598.16 may preserve the marriage.

k. Except where the respondent is a resident of this state and is served by personal service, state that the petitioner has been for the last year a resident of the state, specifying the county in which the petitioner has resided and the length of such residence in the statenafter deducting all absences from the state, and that the maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a dissolution of marriage only.

2. The petition shall be verified by the petitioner.

3. The allegations of the petition shall be established by competent evidence. The statutory requirement for dissolution of marriage, that marriage breakdown be established by competent evidence, is mandatory, and may not be satisfied by parties' stipulation [a written mutual agreement] to that effect.

[This is a holding of Craft v. Craft, 226 N.W.2d Iowa 1975 at 6, 9]

More from Craft:

"Respondent's first assignment [the first argument of the response] asserts a failure to comply with 598.7 and 598.8, The Code. 598.7 provides: 'The petition must be verified by the petitioner and its allegations established by competent evidence.' Section 598.8 provides: 'Hearings for dissolution of marriage shall be held in open court upon the oral testimony of witnesses...

"'Both parties appeared at trial and testified. Neither testified as to the grounds for dissolution... "'The provisions of 598.7 and 598.8 are mandatory. The parties are not entitled to dissolution merely by stipulating for it. The rule is of ancient origin and has obtained in Iowa from earliest times. In Lyster v. Lyster, 1 Iowa 130 (1855) we considered a divorce sought on a ground (authorized by the 1851 Code) that the parties "cannot live together in peace and happiness." We held:

"'***The law requires that the court shall be satisfied; that it "shall be made fully apparent to the court, that the parties cannot live together in peace and happiness", and not that the parties shall be satisfied. It is not alone the immediate parties to this proceeding that are affected, but in most instances, the care and disposition of CHILDREN AND PROPERTY; and, in all cases, the proper MORAL ORDER AND PEACE OF SOCIETY will and must arise.***' 1 Iowa at page 131

"The principle and the reasons for it persist. The legitimate interests of the State in marriage termination were recently recognized in Sosna v. Iowa, ...95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (decided January 14, 1975).Respondent is right in arguing the requirements of 598.7 and 598.8 cannot be obviated [satisfied] by stipulation."

Unfortunately the crucial truths of this case were trivialized by accepting a petitioner's oral statement about the marriage breakdown, unsupported by any evidence, and with no rebuttal allowed the respondent, as "satisfactory evidence". But perhaps even that tragic failure is understandable, in light of the confusion in the wake of the lack of any definition of "legitimate objects of matrimony".

598.7 Mediation. 598.7A Mediation. Repealed by 2005 Acts, ch 69, §58. See §598.7.

598.8 Hearings — exceptions.

1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, hearings for dissolution of marriage shall be held in open court upon the oral testimony of witnesses, or upon the depositions of such witnesses taken as in other equitable actions or taken by a commissioner appointed by the court. The court may in its discretion upon the request of either party but not over the objections of both parties, close the hearing. Hearings held for the purpose of determining child custody may be limited in attendance by the court. [Redundant] Upon request of either party, the court shall provide security in the courtroom during the custody hearing if a history of domestic abuse relating to either party exists. 2. The court may enter a decree of dissolution without a hearing under either of the following circumstances: a. All of the following circumstances have been met: (1) The parties have certified in writing that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved. (2) All documents required by the court and by statute have been filed. (3) The parties have entered into a written agreement settling all of the issues involved in the dissolution of marriage. b. The respondent has not entered a general or special appearance or filed a motion or pleading in the case, the waiting period provided under section 598.19 has expired, and all of the following circumstances have been met: (1) The petitioner has certified in writing that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved. (2) All documents required by the court and by statute have been filed. [C73, §2222; C97, §3173; C24, 27, 31, 35, 39, §10472; C46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, §598.5; C71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, §598.8] 95 Acts, ch 165, §1; 95 Acts, ch 182, §21; 2000 Acts, ch 1034, §1, 2

598.9 Residence — failure of proof. 598.10 Temporary orders. 598.11 How temporary order made — changes — retroactive modification. 598.12 Guardian ad litem for minor child. 1. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the minor child or children of the parties who has asked a judge for representation, and who is mature enough to participate in any judicial proceeding that will affect the child. Before appointing a guardian ad litem, the judge shall be certain the child fully understands four options: (1) court-appointed counsel in which an attorney representing the child is paid by the court and selected by the court, although the court will approve any attorney selected by the child and will not approve any attorney which the child rejects – and the child retains the authority to “fire” or dismiss his attorney at any time and proceed pro-se; (2) parent-retained counsel in which an attorney representing the child is paid for and selected by the parents; (3) Pro-se defense, in which the child is permitted at the counsel table and may participate directly in the trial without legal representation, with or without the whispered assistance of an attorney, paralegal, or friend; or (4) no separate counsel, where the child is a passive party to the case, the only active parties to the case being the parents and the state. But the parents may choose court-appointed counsel which the parents select but for which the court pays, so that the parents will have like opportunity with the DHS to present evidence on behalf of the child. The guardian ad litem shall be a practicing attorney and shall be solely responsible for representing the best interests of the minor child or children. The guardian ad litem shall be independent of the court and other parties to the proceeding and shall be unprejudiced and uncompromised in the guardian ad litem’s independent actions. a. Unless otherwise enlarged or circumscribed by a court having jurisdiction over the child or by operation of law, the duties of a guardian ad litem with respect to a child shall include all of the following: (1) Conducting an initial in-person interview with the child, if the child’s age is appropriate for the interview, and interviewing each parent, guardian, or other person having custody of the child. (2) Maintaining regular contact with the child. (3) Visiting the home, residence, or both home and residence of the child and any prospective home or residence of the child. (4) Interviewing any person providing medical, mental health, social, educational, or other services to the child, prior to any court-ordered hearing. (5) Obtaining knowledge of facts, circumstances, and parties involved in the matter in which the person is appointed guardian ad litem. (6) Documenting the child's input into whether the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed. (6) Attending any depositions, hearings, or trials in the matter in which the person is appointed guardian ad litem, and filing motions or responses or making objections when necessary. The guardian ad litem may cause witnesses to appear, offer evidence, and question witnesses on behalf of the best interests of the child. The guardian ad litem may offer proposed or requested relief and arguments in the same manner allowed the parties by the court. However, the guardian ad litem shall not testify, serve as a witness, or file a written report in the matter. b. The order appointing the guardian ad litem shall grant authorization to the guardian ad litem to interview any relevant person and inspect and copy any records relevant to the proceedings, if not prohibited by federal law. The order shall specify that the guardian ad litem may interview any person providing medical, mental health, social, educational, or other services to the child; may attend any meeting with the medical or mental health providers, service providers, organizations, or educational institutions regarding the child, if deemed necessary by the guardian ad litem; may inspect and copy any records relevant to the proceedings; and shall specifically be authorized to communicate with any individual or person appointed by the court to conduct a home-study investigation. The parent, guardian, or other person having custody of the child shall immediately execute any release necessary to allow the guardian ad litem to effect the authorization granted under this paragraph. 2. The same person shall not serve both as the child’s attorney and as guardian ad litem, nor shall the same person serve both as the child and family reporter and as guardian ad litem. The child’s interest shall not be represented by more than one attorney not of the parent’s choosing. If DHS involvement has already created an attorney charged with representing the child’s best interests, the divorce court shall not appoint another, nor allow an additional Attorney General or “state” attorney. 3. The court shall enter an order in favor of the guardian ad litem for fees and disbursements as submitted by the guardian ad litem who has been appointed at the request of the child, and the amount shall be charged against the party responsible for court costs unless the court determines that the party responsible for court costs is indigent, in which event the amount shall be borne by the county. The budget for any “state” attorney chosen by neither the child nor the parents shall come from the budget of that attorney’s state department. [C71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, §598.12; 82 Acts, ch 1250, §3] 83 Acts, ch 96, §157, 159; 2000 Acts, ch 1067, §1; 2005 Acts, ch 69, §34; 2017 Acts, ch 43, §2 Referred to in §598.10, 598C.310, 600B.40 598.12A Attorney for minor child. 1. The court may appoint an attorney to represent the minor child or children of the parties. If appointed under this section, the child’s attorney shall be solely responsible for representing the minor child or children. The child’s attorney shall be independent of the court and other parties to the proceeding and shall be unprejudiced and uncompromised in the attorney’s independent actions. a. Unless otherwise enlarged or circumscribed by a court having jurisdiction over the child or by operation of law, the duties of an attorney with respect to a child shall include allof the following: (1) Conducting an initial in-person interview with the child, if the child’s age is appropriate for the interview, and interviewing each parent, guardian, or other person having custody of the child if authorized by the person’s legal counsel. (2) Maintaining regular contact with the child. (3) Interviewing any person providing medical, mental health, social, educational, or other services to the child, as necessary to advance the child’s interests. (4) Obtaining knowledge of facts, circumstances, and the parties involved in the matter as necessary to advance the child’s interests. (5) Attending any depositions, hearings, and trials in the matter and filing motions or responses or making objections when necessary. The child’s attorney may cause witnesses to appear, offer evidence on behalf of the child, and question witnesses. The child’s attorneynmay offer proposed or requested relief and arguments in the same manner allowed the partiesnby the court. However, the child’s attorney shall not testify, serve as a witness, or file a written nreport in the matter. b. The order appointing the child’s attorney shall grant authorization to the child’s attorney to interview any relevant person and inspect and copy any records relevant to the proceedings, if not prohibited by federal law. The order shall specify that the child’s attorney may interview any person providing medical, mental health, social, educational, or other services to the child; may attend any meeting with the medical or mental health providers, service providers, organizations, or educational institutions regarding the child, if deemed necessary by the child’s attorney; and may inspect and copy any records relevant to the proceedings. The parent, guardian, or other person having custody of the child shall immediately execute any release necessary to allow the child’s attorney to effect the authorization granted under this paragraph. 2. The same person shall not serve as both the child’s guardian ad litem and the child’s attorney, nor shall the same person serve as both the child and family reporter and as the child’s attorney. 3. The court shall enter an order in favor of the child’s attorney for fees and disbursements as submitted by the child’s attorney, and the amount shall be charged against the party responsible for court costs unless the court determines that the party responsible for court costs is indigent, in which event the amount shall be borne by the county. 2017 Acts, ch 43, §3 Referred to in §598.10, 600B.40

Reasons for repealing 598.12A: I recommend deleting following section, 598.12A, because it duplicates 598.12 so far as I can discern. Two court-appointed attorneys for a child who barely know the child compared to either parent, whose fees are charged to a parent, is cruel and unusual punishment. Even one attorney adds very questionable value to the inquiry. More reasons to strike: The tiny budgets of guardian ad litems/lawyers are a problem. The appointed attorneys are motivated to keep their hearings as short as possible. Another problem is the pressure on them not to be "too litigious" in defense of their clients lest they be removed from the list of available guardian ad litems. Charges like these were authoritatively documented in an amazing report published February 6, 1992: the San Diego County Grand Jury's investigation of their San Diego County Child Protection Programs and Foster Care. A copy was transmitted to our state law library. It inspired the Iowa Republican State Convention on June 13 of 1992 to adopt a plank calling for a similar Grand Jury investigation of our own DHS, an event which so far has not happened. Until it does, we cannot say authoritatively how endemic these problems are, in Iowa 13 years later, as it is alleged by former elementary school principal John Harvey of VOCAL (Victims Of Child Abuse Laws), the impetus behind that 1992 plank and host of a VOCAL cable access program in Des Moines for 10 years. But in the absence of clear evidence that these problems do not still exist, at least we can be careful about expanding these potential problems. (By the way, the Grand Jury's formal recommendation #92/91 was "Encourage the participation and attendance of VOCAL...leadership in the Juvenile Justice Commission....") The San Diego Grand Jury's 56 page report said of guardian ad litems: "Testimony was consistent indicating that there is considerable range of ability among the attorneys who represent minors. Some of them are excellent; others are marginal. Court appointed panel attorneys are seriously underpaid. Panel attorneys who do independent investigations are scarce. "In a seriously contested case, the Jury discovered that the attorney for the minors had not met her two young clients in the two years the case had been in Juvenile Court. The Jury found rare instances in which the minor's attorney had interviewed the parents and/or extended family. "Ultimately, a family is billed for minor's counsel despite the fact that they have no input in the choice of this attorney. The approved list of panel attorneys is perceived as subject to political pressure. Panel attorneys told the Jury that if they are representing the child and oppose DSS, they fear removal from the list. One panel attorney, after 'challenging' the judge scheduled to hear a case, was immediately removed as the minor's counsel. Another Family Court minor['s counsel reported the same experience with the same judge. Panel attorneys representing the parents are fearful of appearing too litigious on behalf of their clients." Put yourself in the place of the "guardian ad litem". You have never met the child. You barely know the parents. What you know of the parents mostly comes from accusations against them in the record. Even if you had unlimited access to the parents to get their side of the story, your job is not to represent them. Meanwhile you have worked with the DHS attorney, the juvenile court judge, and the DHS staff, for years. You know their birthdays, their hobbies, the football teams they love, and their kids' names. You do lunch with some of them, and with all of them you at least have a working relationship. So then here you are in court, amidst all your friends, and in come the parents. The worst-dressed people of the whole group; no thousand-dollar duds like the rest of you can afford. Some don't even try to dress up. Or, more accurately, "dressing up" in their world doesn't call for the same styles as in yours. And what terrible accusations! Some accusations are so terrible that it almost becomes irrelevant whether or not they are true! Besides that, you enjoy getting paid for your work. You like being able to turn in your hours on a job, and getting paid proportionately. You don't like getting hundreds of dollars less for a case than your hours on it deserve, and not finding out until you have put in the hours. It puts you in a real bad mood. So you are inclined to please the boys who make out your check. Even if they are in the same office with the boys representing one of "the other sides" in your case. Tell me honestly: which side would YOU be inclined to favor? Ask any parent who has ever opposed the DHS in court, whether this is not an accurate picture of the terror they faced! How is justice served by forcing a small child to have an attorney not of his own choosing? Faretta v. Brown, 422 U.S. 806, 820-821, says "The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant ?? not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists. ...An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense." The possibility that an unwanted attorney may have a different agenda than the child is exactly what many critics of the Child Abuse Industry have alleged is what happens. Among those critics is an entire Grand Jury, in San Diego, which investigated its DHS in 1992. (See the "Families In Crisis Report #2, a Report by the 1991-1992 San Diego County Grand Jury, Feb 6, 1992".) Despite these findings, the Jury was "unalterably opposed" to any talk of reducing the role of guardian ad litems, because "DSS and the Child cannot be seen as having the same interests." In other words, if the parent sees that the judge views the dispute as between the interests of the parent (represented by the parents' attorney) and the interests of the child (represented by the DHS), parents, who figure they understand the child's best interests better than anyone else in the room, are going to figure out this game is rigged against their whole family! Better to throw another attorney in there to bolster the myth of objectivity, never mind he serves at the pleasure of "the system" and seldom has more than casual meetings with the children. The system would be more honest if it stopped regarding either the DHS or guardian ad litems as better representatives of the child's interest than the parents! The bureaucrats should be stripped of all such pretense, and all parties should simply work to establish just what are the child's best interests. The fourth problem is more important than the first three: there is no reason to assume an additional bureaucrat will add to the wisdom already available from both parents and the judge. The very presence of a guardian ad litem, or lawyer "for the child", is a statement by the legislature that the judgment of those who love and know the child the most -- the parents, the authorities designated by God -- is less trustworthy than that of a bureaucrat who is a stranger to the child. What can justify the assumption that an additional expensive bureaucrat who barely knows the child will be any more knowledgeable about, or sympathetic to, the child's needs, than the prosecutor or judge? But if lawmakers feel that, politically, they cannot oppose the expansion of guardian ad litems into divorce law, much less repeal their institution altogether where parents are present, maybe they are willing to make guardian ad litems do, in divorce cases, what all children want most, regardless of how bad the parents think the marriage is: petition the court to put the divorce on hold! If guardian ad litems are to be added to divorce law, in other words, let also the Legitimate Objects of Matrimony finally be defined, and let evidence of their condition be a required focus of guardian ad litems! After all, Iowa law already says, in effect, that frankly, divorce is not in the best interests of the child! It defines "best interests of the child" as the "maximum continuing contact of the child with both parents." (598.1(6) Let the Guardian Ad Litem petition the court for THAT.

598.12B Child custody investigators and child and family reporters. 598.13 Financial statements filed. 598.14 Attachment. 598.15 Mandatory course — parties to certain proceedings. 598.16 Conciliation — domestic relations divisions. 1. A majority of the judges in any judicial district, with the cooperation of any county board of supervisors in the district, may establish a domestic relations division of the district court of the county where the board is located. The division shall offer counseling and related services to persons before the court. 2. The court may on its own motion or upon the motion of a party require the parties to participate in conciliation efforts for a period of sixty days or less following the issuance of an order setting forth the conciliation procedure and the conciliator. The purpose of conciliation shall be to maximize the continuing contact of the child with both parents and to help the parents grow in kindness, gentleness, humility, forgiveness and patience with each other, [Colossians 3:12] for the benefit of themselves as well as for the children, and for the moral order and peace of society. [Craft v. Craft, 1975] These goals are still important after a dissolution, but ultimate success of conciliation is not just restoring marriage but making it fresh, vibrant, and healthy. In making a determination under this section, the court shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to whether a history of abuse or domestic violence, serious financial irresponsibility, adultery, abandonment, or gross unreasonableness exists, and the potential response of these problems to conciliation. 3. Every order for conciliation shall require the conciliator to file a written report by a date certain which shall state the conciliation procedures undertaken and such other matters as may have been required by the court. The report shall be a part of the record unless otherwise ordered by the court. Such conciliation procedure may include but is not limited to referrals to the domestic relations division of the court, if established, public or private marriage counselors, family service agencies, community health centers, physicians and clergy. 4. The costs of conciliation procedures shall be paid in full or in part by the parties and taxed as court costs; however, if the court determines that the parties will be unable to pay the costs without prejudicing their financial ability to provide themselves and any minor children with economic necessities, the costs may be paid in full or in part by the county. 5. Persons providing counseling and other services pursuant to this section are not court employees, but are subject to court supervision. [C71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, §598.16] 83 Acts, ch 123, §194, 209; 83 Acts, ch 186, §10110, 10201; 93 Acts, ch 54, §11; 2007 Acts, ch 180, §1; 2014 Acts, ch 1107, §18; 2017 Acts, ch 43, §5; 2019 Acts, ch 63, §1 Referred to in §331.424, 598.5, 602.11101

598.17 Dissolution of marriage — evidence. 1. A decree dissolving the marriage may be entered when the court is satisfied from the evidence presented that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved. The statutory requirement for dissolution of marriage, that marriage breakdown be established by competent evidence, is mandatory, and may not be satisfied by parties' stipulation [a written mutual agreement] to that effect. It is not alone the immediate parties to this proceeding that are affected, but in most instances, the care and disposition of CHILDREN AND PROPERTY; and, in all cases, the proper MORAL ORDER AND PEACE OF SOCIETY will and must arise. [This is a holding of Craft v. Craft, 226 N.W.2d Iowa 1975 at 6, 9] If the Court is not so satisfied, from the evidence presented, the Court may, upon learning the issues that brought the petitioner to the Court, order conciliation, mediation or binding arbitration over those issues, as appropriate, in addition to any advice offered by the Court.

More from Craft: In Lyster v. Lyster, 1 Iowa 130 (1855) we considered a divorce sought on a ground (authorized by the 1851 Code) that the parties "cannot live together in peace and happiness." We held: "'***The law requires that the court shall be satisfied; that it "shall be made fully apparent to the court, that the parties cannot live together in peace and happiness", and not that the parties shall be satisfied. It is not alone the immediate parties to this proceeding that are affected, but in most instances, the care and disposition of CHILDREN AND PROPERTY; and, in all cases, the proper MORAL ORDER AND PEACE OF SOCIETY will and must arise.***' 1 Iowa at page 131 "The principle and the reasons for it persist. The legitimate interests of the State in marriage termination were recently recognized in Sosna v. Iowa, ...95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (decided January 14, 1975).Respondent is right in arguing the requirements of 598.7 and 598.8 cannot be obviated [satisfied] by stipulation." The decree shall state that the dissolution is granted to the parties, and shall not state that it is granted to only one party. 2. If at the time of trial petitioner fails to present satisfactory evidence that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved, the respondent may then proceed to present such evidence as though the respondent had filed the original petition, or the respondant may move for dismissal of the petition. 3. A dissolution of marriage granted when one of the spouses has mental illness shall not relieve the other spouse of any obligation imposed by law as a result of the marriage for the support of the spouse with mental illness. The court may make an order for the support or may waive the support obligation when satisfied from the evidence that it would create an undue hardship on the obliged spouse or that spouse’s other dependents. [C71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, §598.17] 89 Acts, ch 296, §77; 96 Acts, ch 1129, §101; 2016 Acts, ch 1011, §121 Referred to in §97A.1, 410.10, 411.1 598.18 Recrimination not a bar to dissolution of marriage. 598.19 Waiting period before decree. No decree dissolving a marriage shall be granted in any proceeding before ninety days shall have elapsed from the day the original notice is served, or from the last day of publication of notice, or from the date that waiver or acceptance of original notice is filed or until after any court-ordered conciliation is completed, whichever period shall be longer. However, the court may in its discretion, on written motion supported by affidavit setting forth grounds of emergency or necessity and facts which satisfy the court that immediate action is warranted or required to protect the substantive rights or interests of any party or person who might be affected by the decree, hold a hearing and grant a decree dissolving the marriage prior to the expiration of the applicable period, provided that requirements of notice have been complied with. In such case the grounds of emergency or necessity and the facts with respect thereto shall be recited in the decree unless otherwise ordered by the court. [In my first divorce, my wife alleged “emergency”, giving no serious reason, which I was too legally ignorant to oppose, and the judge mindlessly accepted it. This unlimited language invites frivolous treatment of a “cooling off” period.] The court may enter an order finding the respondent in default and waiving any court-ordered conciliation when the respondent has failed to file an appearance within the time set forth in the original notice. If the respondant has not filed an appearance within one month of the date of original service, the Clerk of Court shall mail a notice to the respondant’s address of record warning that failure to respond will result in a default judgment. If respondant still has not filed within two months, the Clerk shall mail a second notice. [In my second divorce, I was more legally experienced but forgot about the automatic default from not responding, and my relationship with my wife was actually so positive that I was trusting here with a lot and half expected the divorce to be dismissed. As my wife later handed me the default decree she said her lawyer had advised her to take me for everything but she had declined.] 598.20 Forfeiture of marital rights. 598.20A Beneficiary revocation — life insurance. 598.20B Beneficiary revocation — other contracts. 598.21 Orders for disposition of property. 1. General principles. Upon every judgment of annulment, dissolution, or separate maintenance, the court shall divide the property of the parties and transfer the title of the property accordingly, including ordering the parties to execute a quitclaim deed or ordering a change of title for tax purposes and delivery of the deed or change of title to the county recorder of the county in which each parcel of real estate is located. 2. Duties of county recorder. The county recorder shall record each quitclaim deed or change of title and shall collect the fee specified in section 331.507, subsection 2, paragraph “a”, and the fees specified in section 331.604. 3. Duties of clerk of court. If the court orders a transfer of title to real property, the clerk of court shall issue a certificate under chapter 558 relative to each parcel of real estate affected by the order and immediately deliver the certificate for recording to the county recorder of the county in which the real estate is located. Any fees assessed shall be included as part of the court costs. The county recorder shall deliver the certificates to the county auditor as provided in section 558.58, subsection 1. 4. Property for children. The court may protect and promote the best interests of children of the parties by setting aside a portion of the property of the parties in a separate fund or conservatorship for the support, maintenance, education, and general welfare of the minor children. 5. Division of property. The court shall divide all property, except inherited property or gifts received or expected by one party, equitably between the parties after considering all ofnthe following: a. The length of the marriage. b. The property brought to the marriage by each party. c. The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party’s contribution in homemaking and child care services. d. The parents’ financial stewardship of the family assets, as a measure of likelihood that the more responsible parent, given a larger share, will preserve them for the benefit of the children. d. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties. e. The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power ofnthe other. f. The earning capacity of each party, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children, and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. g. The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live in the family home for a reasonable period to the party having custody of the children, or if the parties have joint legal custody, to the party having physical care of the children. h. The amount and duration of an order granting support payments to either party pursuant to section 598.21A and whether the property division should be in lieu of such payments. i. Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits, vested or unvested. Future interests may be considered, but expectancies or interests arising from inherited or gifted property created under a will or other instrument under which the trustee, trustor, trust protector, or owner has the power to remove the party in question as a beneficiary, shall not be considered. j. The tax consequences to each party. k. Any written agreement made by the parties concerning property distribution. l. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement. m. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual case. 6. Inherited and gifted property. Property inherited by either party or gifts received by either party prior to or during the course of the marriage is the property of that party and is not subject to a property division under this section except upon a finding that refusal to divide the property is inequitable to the other party or to the children of the marriage. 7. Not subject to modification. Property divisions made under this chapter are not subject to modification. 8. Necessary content of order. Orders made pursuant to this section need mention only those factors relevant to the particular case for which the orders are made but shall contain the names, birth dates, addresses, and counties of residence of the petitioner and respondent. 598.21A Orders for spousal support. 598.21B Orders for child support and medical support. 598.21C Modification of child, spousal, or medical support orders. §598.21D, DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 598.21F Postsecondary education subsidy. 598.21G Minor parent — parenting classes. 598.22 Support payments — clerk of court — collection services center or comparable government entity in another state — defaults — security. 598.22A Satisfaction of support payments. 598.22B Information required in order or judgment. 598.22C Child support — social security disability dependent benefits. 598.22D Separate fund or conservatorship for support. 598.23A Contempt proceedings for provisions of support payments — activity governed by a license. 598.24 Costs if party is in default or contempt. 598.25 Parties and court granting marriage dissolution decree — notice. 598.26 Record — impounding — violation indictable. 598.27 Reserved. 598.29 Annulling illegal marriage — causes. 598.30 Validity determined. 598.31 Children — legitimacy. 598.32 Annulment — compensation. 598.33 Order to vacate. 598.34 Recipients of public assistance — assignment of support payments. 598.35 Grandparent — great-grandparent — visitation rights. Repealed by 2007 Acts, ch 218, §208. See §600C.1. (Tell me if you are interested in my challenge to this repeal. I have spent time with the grandparents whose Iowa Supreme Court case caused this repeal. It in turn was pushed by a U.S. Supreme Court case that came down in the middle of Iowa’s case. My challenge satisfies SCOTUS’ concerns with amended language, shows that SCOTUS concerns don’t apply generally, and challenges SCOTUS’ jurisdiction over Iowa domestic policy beyond the jurisdiction challenge already voiced by others.) 598.36 Attorney fees in proceeding to modify order or decree. 598.37 Name change. 598.41 Custody of children. 1. a. The court may provide for joint custody of the child by the parties. The court, insofar as is reasonable and in the best interest of the child, shall order the custody award, including liberal visitation rights where appropriate, which will assure the child the opportunity for the maximum continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved the marriage, and which will encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of raising the child unless direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child, other children, or a parent is likely to result from such contact with one parent. Evidence of commitment to the marriage bonds prior to dissolution, in order to maximize the continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents for as long as possible by neither filing for an unnecessary dissolution nor causing a dissolution to become necessary, shall be recognized as commitment to the best interests of the children. Evidence of weak commitment to the marriage bond shall include domestic violence, serious financial irresponsibility, adultery, abandonment, or gross unreasonableness. b. Notwithstanding paragraph “a”, if the court finds that a history of domestic abuse domestic violence, serious financial irresponsibility, adultery, abandonment exists, and to the extent concliation is unsuccessful, a rebuttable presumption against the awarding of joint custody exists. c. The court shall consider the denial by one parent of the child’s opportunity for maximum continuing contact with the other parent, without just cause, a significant factor in determining the proper custody arrangement. Just cause may include a determination by the court pursuant to subsection 3, paragraph “j”, that a history of domestic abuse exists between the parents. d. If a history of domestic abuse violence exists [the only reason to replace “abuse” with “violence” is to make the paragraph subject to the definition in section one] as determined by a court pursuant to subsection 3, paragraph “j”, and if a parent who is a victim of such domestic abuse relocates or is absent from the home based upon the fear of or actual acts or threats of domestic abuse perpetrated by the other parent, the court shall not consider the relocation or absence of that parent as a factor against that parent in the awarding of custody or visitation. e. Unless otherwise ordered by the court in the custody decree, both parents shall have legal access to information concerning the child, including but not limited to medical, educational and law enforcement records. 2. a. On the application of either parent, the court shall consider granting joint custody in cases where the parents do not agree to joint custody. b. If the court does not grant joint custody under this subsection, the court shall cite clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to the factors in subsection 3, that joint custody is unreasonable and not in the best interest of the child to the extent that the legal custodial relationship between the child and a parent should be severed. c. A finding by the court that a history of domestic abuse exists, as specified in subsection 3, paragraph “j”, which is not rebutted, shall outweigh consideration of any other factor specified in subsection 3 in the determination of the awarding of custody under this subsection. d. Before ruling upon the joint custody petition in these cases, unless the court determines that a history of domestic abuse exists as specified in subsection 3, paragraph “j”, or unless the court determines that direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child, other children, or a parent is likely to result, the court may require the parties to participate in custody mediation to determine whether joint custody is in the best interest of the child. The court may require the child’s participation in the mediation insofar as the court determines the child’s participation is advisable. e. The costs of custody mediation shall be paid in full or in part by the parties and taxed as court costs. 3. In considering what custody arrangement under subsection 2 is in the best interest of the minor child, the court shall consider the following factors: a. Whether each parent would be a suitable custodian for the child. b. Whether the psychological and emotional needs and development of the child will suffer due to lack of active contact with and attention from both parents. c. Whether the parents can communicate with each other regarding the child’s needs. d. Whether both parents have actively cared for the child before and since the separation. e. Whether each parent can support the other parent’s relationship with the child. Failure to do so shall not be imputed from teaching the values that hold families together, with respect, love, and forgiveness for lapses. f. Whether the custody arrangement is in accord with the child’s wishes or whether the child has strong opposition, taking into consideration the child’s age and maturity. g. Whether one or both of the parents agree or are opposed to joint custody. h. The geographic proximity of the parents. i. Whether the safety of the child, other children, or the other parent will be jeopardized by the awarding of joint custody or by unsupervised or unrestricted visitation. j. Whether a history of domestic abuse, as defined in section 236.2, exists. In determining whether a history of domestic abuse exists, the court’s consideration shall include but is not limited to commencement of an action pursuant to section 236.3, the issuance of a protective order against the parent or the issuance of a court order or consent agreement pursuant to section 236.5, the issuance of an emergency order pursuant to section 236.6, the holding of a parent in contempt pursuant to section 664A.7, the response of a peace officer to the scene of alleged domestic abuse or the arrest of a parent following response to a report of alleged domestic abuse, or a conviction for domestic abuse assault pursuant to section 708.2A, but shall consider these charges and convictions unproved, for purposes of dissolution proceedings, where no serious physical injury has been confirmed by a medical doctor, and where the record lacks reasonable evidence that any injury was not an accident. k. Whether a parent has allowed a person custody or control of, or unsupervised access to a child after knowing the person is required to register or is on the sex offender registry as a sex offender under chapter 692A. 4. Subsection 3 shall not apply when parents agree to joint custody. 5. a. If joint legal custody is awarded to both parents, the court may award joint physical care to both joint custodial parents upon the request of either parent. Prior to ruling on the request for the award of joint physical care, the court may require the parents to submit, either individually or jointly, a proposed joint physical care parenting plan. A proposed joint physical care parenting plan shall address how the parents will make decisions affecting the child, how the parents will provide a home for the child, how the child’s time will be divided between the parents and how each parent will facilitate the child’s time with the other parent, arrangements in addition to court-ordered child support for the child’s expenses, how the parents will resolve major changes or disagreements affecting the child including changes that arise due to the child’s age and developmental needs, and any other issues the court may require. If the court denies the request for joint physical care, the determination shall be accompanied by specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that the awarding of joint physical care is not in the best interest of the child. b. If joint physical care is not awarded under paragraph “a”, and only one joint custodial parent is awarded physical care, the parent responsible for providing physical care shall support the other parent’s relationship with the child. Physical care awarded to one parent does not affect the other parent’s rights and responsibilities as a joint legal custodian of the child. Rights and responsibilities as joint legal custodian of the child include but are not limited to equal participation in decisions affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious instruction. 6. If the parties have more than one minor child, and the court awards each party the physical custody of one or more of the children, upon application by either party, and if it is reasonable and in the best interest of the children, the court shall include a provision in the custody order directing the parties to allow visitation between the children in each party’s custody. 7. When a parent awarded legal custody or physical care of a child cannot act as custodian or caretaker because the parent has died or has been judicially adjudged incompetent, the court shall award legal custody including physical care of the child to the surviving parent unless the court finds that such an award is not in the child’s best interest. 8. If an application for modification of a decree or a petition for modification of an order is filed, based upon differences between the parents regarding the custody arrangement established under the decree or order, unless the court determines that a history of domestic abuse exists as specified in subsection 3, paragraph “j”, or unless the court determines that direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child, other children, or a parent is likely to result, the court may require the parents to participate in mediation to attempt to resolve the differences between the parents. 9. All orders relating to custody of a child are subject to chapter 598B.

598.41A Visitation — history of crimes against a minor.

19:23, 5 November 2024 (UTC)19:23, 5 November 2024 (UTC)Dave Leach R-IA Bible Lover-musician-grandpa (talk) 19:23, 5 November 2024 (UTC)

598.41B Visitation — restrictions — murder of parent. [The following is a classic example of the difference between God’s law, which fill 1200 pages which do not change from thousands of years and are written to be applied with wisdom to changing situations as they fit, and man’s laws which fill whole buildings and change every year and attempt to ameliorate every situation where some stupid judge might do something stupid, and which, despite this goal, ends with a caveat that is incredibly stupid:] 1. Notwithstanding section 598.41, the court shall not do either of the following: a. Enforce an existing order awarding visitation rights to a child’s parent, which was obtained prior to that parent’s conviction for first degree murder in the murder of the child’s other parent, unless such enforcement is in the best interest of the child.